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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on macroeconomics of development. The
first chapter discusses the impact of educational corruption on economic devel-
opment. Its main contribution lies in quantifying two channels of educational
corruption: a direct channel, whereby incompetent workers affect production
due to a misallocation of talent, and a dynamic indirect channel, which can be
referred to as a teacher’s effect on the availability of competent agents for pro-
duction. The results suggest that, for the countries with the highest levels of
educational corruption, the losses in output per capita induced by the indirect
channel are ten times as large as the ones induced by the direct channel. The
removal of educational corruption would increase the output per capita of these
countries by more than 20%.
The second chapter examines corruption as a social norm and allows civil soci-
ety to play a role in the fight against it. The theory shows that a more engaged
civil society leads to lower levels of corruption but has an ambiguous effect on
social capital (captured by the notion of honesty). Wage policies are proven to
be ineffective in the proposed economic environment. The analysis of survey
data from African countries indicates that the predictions of the model find em-
pirical support and that the causality goes from civic engagement to corruption.
The third chapter investigates the factors shaping inter-ethnic relations through
the links between one’s trust in one’s own ethnic group (intra-ethnic trust)
ii
and one’s trust in other ethnic groups (inter-ethnic trust). Based on survey
data from African countries, it is shown that, even though most individuals
have similar levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, differences exist for a non-
negligible fraction of them. For each level of intra-ethnic trust, the analysis
shows that characteristics at the individual, ethnic-group, and district levels,
as well as sustained growth over long periods of time, are consistently associ-
ated with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust. A contrast between the procycli-
cality of inter-ethnic trust and the countercyclicality of intra-ethnic trust is also
established.
iii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My dissertation consists of three chapters, which share a unifying theme: the
relationships between formal institutions (e.g., education system, bureaucracy),
informal institutions (e.g., civil society organizations, social capital, ethnic re-
lationships), and economic development (e.g., output and growth).
The first chapter studies the impact of educational corruption on economic
development. Its main contribution lies in identifying and quantifying two
broad mechanisms under which educational corruption affects the economy: a
direct (static) channel and an indirect (dynamic) channel. A model is devel-
oped, and its key feature is a corruptible university. In other words, incompe-
tent students can get diplomas if they pay a bribe. However, the presence of
incompetent graduates affects the quality of the pool of workers and causes an
adverse selection problem for firms. The induced misallocation of talent forces
production to fall. This is the direct effect of corruption. Because teachers are
2hired from the pool of graduates, corruption also undermines the quality of the
teacher pool. Consequently, the creation of skills diminishes, fewer competent
workers are available for production, and the skilled wage premium increases.
This is the indirect, or feedback, effect of educational corruption. The feed-
back effect has dynamic long-term effects on output. Earlier studies have not
analyzed the indirect channel and have relied on qualitative results only.
Based on data on educational corruption, the public sector, and college en-
rollment and completion rates, the model is then calibrated. The benchmark
model allows to give an idea of the impact of corruption on the quality of teach-
ers. Hence, the most corrupted countries (the countries with more than 10%
percent of people paying a bribe in the education sector) have a teacher qual-
ity that is only 69% of the quality of other countries. Such a low quality of
teachers has dramatic implications for the creation of knowledge. For exam-
ple, a student with the highest ability level (=1) has only an 80% probability
of becoming competent in the most corrupted countries. In comparison, this
probability is close to 100% in the least corrupted countries.
To assess the respective roles of the direct and indirect mechanisms, coun-
terfactual experiments are implemented. The results suggest that the most
corrupted countries in the sample would gain 9% in output if the indirect mech-
anism was shutdown. These gains are ten times larger than those resulting
from the direct channel. Furthermore, removing educational corruption would
increase the output per capita of these countries by more than 20%.
3The second chapter expands on a corruption framework with bureaucrats
and citizens, and allows civil society to play a role in the fight against corrup-
tion. Corruption is treated as a social norm: agents can be honest (i.e., commit
not to participate in corruption) or opportunist (i.e., participate in corruption
if it is optimal to do so). The dynamic evolution of types within the popula-
tion is affected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits in a manner that
borrows from Francois and Zabojnik (2005). The engagement of civil society
(modeled as its effectiveness in catching/punishing opportunist agents) affects
the monitoring of agents directly and the creation of social capital (captured by
the notion of honesty) indirectly.
It is found that greater involvement of civil society in the fight against cor-
ruption, leads to lower levels of corruption but has an ambiguous effect on
social capital. Countries, therefore, enjoy lower levels of corruption not neces-
sarily because they have more social capital, but rather because lower levels
of corruption are tolerated for each level of honest citizens. Interestingly, wage
policies are proven to be ineffective in the proposed economic environment.
The analysis of Round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey data indicates that
the predictions of the model are supported empirically. In addition, the results
suggest that the causality goes from civic engagement to corruption. The novel
approach of this study complements existing work on the role of social norms
and non-pecuniary motivation for corruption.
The third chapter examines the factors shaping inter-ethnic relations through
4the links between one’s trust in one’s own ethnic group (the intra-ethnic trust)
and one’s trust in other ethnic groups (inter-ethnic trust). The study sheds
light on whether or not individuals in Africa exhibit gaps in trusting members
of other ethnic groups with respect to their own, and it determines the factors
that contribute to reducing (and increasing) this gap.
Based on survey data from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer, it is first shown
that, though most individuals have similar levels of intra- and inter-ethnic
trust, differences exist for a non-negligible fraction of them. Then, for each level
of intra-ethnic trust, a multivariate analysis is implemented to uncover the
individual and socio-economic determinants that are significantly associated
with inter-ethnic trust.
The factors that are consistently associated with higher levels of inter-ethnic
trust include (i) the age of the individuals; (ii) their belonging to a group that
does not feel treated unfairly by the government; (iii) their living in a district
with socio-economic infrastructures like markets; (iv) their living in a country
with homogeneous ethnic groups and with sustained growth over long periods
of time. Gender and religious beliefs are weakly correlated with inter-ethnic
trust. Surprisingly, education is ambiguously and inconsistently associated
with inter-ethnic trust. Finally, a contrast between the procyclicality of inter-
ethnic trust and the countercyclicality of intra-ethnic trust is also established
and serves as motivation for a deeper analysis of the dynamic links between
economic growth and intra- and inter-ethnic trust.
5Chapter 2
The Direct and Indirect Channels
of Educational Corruption
In short, places are few, applicants are too many and people are desperate ; a dan-
gerous cocktail of circumstantial factors, making the teacher recruitment process
an easy target for corrupt minded individuals to plan and conduct corrupt activi-
ties.
-The Teacher Service Commission Integrity Study, Kenya
In many professions such as the Police, the Gendarmerie, the Customs, the Ivorian
Administration and in the private sector, you have people of quality mingled with
others who are, at the same time, incompetent and dishonest.
-Jean Louis Billon, Fraternite´ Matin, May 13, 2010. 1
1 The first citation is from Transparency International Kenya (2006). The second citation is
translated from French by the author. Jean Louis Billon was at that time the President of the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Coˆte d’Ivoire.
62.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the significance of educational corruption as a determi-
nant of education quality and economic development. It defines educational
corruption as the buying of diplomas in exchange for bribes and shows that
such corruption affects economies through two broad mechanisms: a direct
channel, whereby incompetent workers affect production, and an indirect chan-
nel, which can be referred to as a teacher’s effect. The teacher’s effect is induced
by the fact that some of the incompetent students of today become the incom-
petent teachers of tomorrow. It will be shown that the lesser known indirect
channel is quantitatively more important.
Educational corruption is prevalent in many regions of the world. Cases of
educational corruption have been reported in poor, emerging and rich countries
– from Africa to Eastern Europe, from China to Italy. In fact, Transparency
International, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that fights corruption,
reported in its Global Corruption Barometer 2007 that, worldwide, education
is the fourth most common sector where people pay a bribe (second sector in
Africa and in the former USSR). Transparency International further provided
evidence that in 22 countries, more than 10% of the people who had a contact
with the education sector confessed that they had paid a bribe in the education
sector.2 Such high levels of educational corruption affect output. Figure 2.1 il-
lustrates the negative relationship between output per capita and educational
2 This is an average for the 2006-2008 period, as estimated by the author. For more details
on the data, please consult Section 2.2.
7corruption, as measured by the proportion of people who paid a bribe in the ed-
ucation sector. This negative relationship is statistically significant and robust
to various specifications, including control for bureaucratic corruption. In this
respect, it is found in Section 2.2 that an increase of one standard deviation
of the measure of educational corruption lowers output per capita from 21% to
45%.
The main idea of the paper is that educational corruption affects the econ-
omy through two broad mechanisms: a direct (static) channel and an indirect
(dynamic) channel. The direct channel arises because incompetent students
with diplomas do not have specific or adequate skills, thereby decreasing pro-
duction. The dynamic indirect effect arises because the incompetent students
with diplomas alter the quality of the institutions of the economy, thereby af-
fecting the next generations. The paper considers a specific and obvious dy-
namic effect: the effect on the education system. Specifically, the dynamic
indirect channel presented in the model is the impact that the incompetent
students of today, who become the incompetent teachers of tomorrow, have on
the economy. The key result of the paper is that the indirect mechanism has
a significantly greater impact than the direct one. It establishes that the most
corrupted countries in the sample could increase output by 9% on average if
the quality of their pool of teachers was perfect. These gains are ten times
larger than those resulting from the direct channel. Furthermore, removing
educational corruption would increase the output per capita of these countries
by more than 20%.
8A dynamic general equilibriumOLG framework that incorporates both chan-
nels is developed. The model features a public and a private sector with two
types of occupations: skilled and unskilled. There are two stages of educa-
tion, basic and advanced (university); the latter is required for public servants
and skilled workers in the private sector. The government-run university is
in charge of developing student skills and a screening technology, the diplo-
mas. The development of skills depends on the quality of the teachers, and the
diplomas are in principle awarded to competent students. Only the competent
students are productive workers in the private skilled occupations and in the
public sector..
The key assumption of the model is that the university is (exogenously) cor-
ruptible. The form that corruption takes is the buying of diplomas at exit.3;4
This corruption generates two effects. First, when incompetent students bribe
officials in order to get a diploma, the quality and quantity of the pool of grad-
uates are affected. The presence of incompetent graduates affects the quality
of the pool of workers and creates an adverse selection problem for firms. The
induced misallocation of talent lowers output. This is the direct (static) ef-
fect of corruption. Second, since teachers are hired from the pool of graduates,
corruption also undermines the quality of the pool of teachers. Consequently,
the creation of skills declines, and fewer competent workers are available for
3 It should be noted that educational corruption takes various forms such as academic fraud,
diversion of resources, grants attribution, and bribes for grades or for admission into an ed-
ucational institution. See Transparency International (2005) for a list of common forms of
educational corruption.
4 One can think of diplomas as the result of a succession of good grades, so the idea can
be generalized to a story where students can buy good grades. It is just easier to work with
the idea of diplomas. Furthermore, corruption at exit is supported by the available data (see
Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2).
9production. This is the indirect (dynamic) effect of educational corruption.
Equilibria in which incompetent workers with diplomas can work in either
the public or the private sector are analyzed. It is assumed that the private
sector is better at monitoring (i.e., detecting/firing) incompetence. Hence, in-
competent graduates tend to end up in the public sector. Importantly, educa-
tion is predominantly public. Individual decisions over entry and bribing are
characterized in the model. Output and wages are determined endogenously in
equilibrium: output falls and skilled wage premium increases with corruption.
The rise in wages is a consequence of the scarcity of competence.
The model is then calibrated to match the countries’ educational aggregates
and educational corruption rates. Finally, in a thought experiment that aims
to assess their respective roles, the direct and indirect mechanisms are se-
quentially shut down. It is established that the loss in output induced by the
feedback effect are quantitatively larger that the ones induced by the direct
effect.
This chapter relates to the literatures on human capital and schooling qual-
ity. There is a consensus that admits the crucial role of human capital for eco-
nomic growth [see Lucas (1988) for example]. Moreover, recent studies have
emphasized the importance of educational and human capital quality on de-
velopment. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) found that the quality of schooling
is an important ingredient for human capital production and that it is pos-
itively correlated with cross-country productivity differences. Erosa, Kore-
shkova, and Restuccia (2010) demonstrated that differences in schooling qual-
ity across countries are quantitatively important. Specifically, using a model
10
where agents can invest in both the quality and the quantity of schooling, they
found that only a 5-fold difference in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) across
countries accounts for a 20-fold difference in the output per worker. In contrast,
without human capital accumulation, an 18-fold difference in TFP is required
to explain the income difference. Similarly, Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) ar-
gued that the quality of human capital is the major contributor to cross-country
differences in output. On the same subject, Pritchett (2001) showed that de-
spite worldwide increases in education attainment, the rates of growth of out-
put per worker are widely different. He advanced that educational quality
were so low in some countries that additional years of schooling would create
no human capital. This is consistent with the model presented in this paper.
Motivation for this chapter of the dynamic mechanism includes recent stud-
ies that depict the quality of teachers as a relevant input in the formation of
skills or human capital. Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) found that an in-
crease by one standard deviation in the quality of teachers generates at least
0.11 standard deviations higher achievements in mathematics, and 0.10 stan-
dard deviations higher achievements in reading. They found that these effects
are bigger than the benefits resulting from a reduction in class size. Hanushek
and Wo¨ßmann (2007) emphasized that “teachers’ quality is enormously impor-
tant in determining student achievement”. They showed that the institutional
structure and school incentives, rather than simply their available resources,
matter the most. Wo¨ßmann (2000) defended similar arguments, he found that
11
the cross-country variability of institutional features where teachers work sig-
nificantly influenced student performance.5 For instance, he found a significant
negative significant effect of teacher unions on student performance. He fur-
ther found a positive influence of teachers’ education on student performance.
Finally, evidence presented in Section 2.2 illustrates the negative impact that
educational corruption exerts on teacher quality.
This chapter is also linked to the large literature that establishes a strong
negative correlation between corruption and economic development.6 This re-
lationship is often analyzed with frameworks in which investments and growth
are deterred by rent-seeking bureaucrats.7 Most models, however, abstract
from the links between education, corruption, and development. Two excep-
tions are World Bank (2010) and Shaw (2007). Indeed, some aspects of educa-
tional corruption overlap with the World Bank’s concept of “quiet corruption”,
which indicates “various types of malpractice of frontline providers (teach-
ers, doctors, inspectors, and other government representatives)”. For instance,
teachers’ absenteeism or diversion of school resources for one’s own purpose
could be included in a broader definition of educational corruption. The sec-
ond exception, Shaw (2007), establishes qualitative links between educational
corruption and economic growth. His work suggests that corruption at entry
5 The institutional features Wo¨ßmann (2000) refers to are the size of the private school-
ing sector, the centralization of examinations and of other decision-making powers, and the
responsibilities and influence of different educational agents. For a theoretical treatment of
the effect of different institutional features of the education system on student performance,
see Bishop and Wo¨ßmann (2004). These features include central examinations, centralization
versus school autonomy, teachersinfluence, parental influence, and competition from private
schools.
6 See Mauro (1995).
7 An important nuance is Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) that shows how rent-
seeking activities deteriorate economic growth through the misallocation of talent.
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implies lower attainment and growth as well as, and higher wage premia. He
finds empirical evidence for both. This chapter departs from Shaw (2007) on
four major theoretical and empirical issues. First, this chapter studies corrup-
tion at exit and considers a role for adverse selection, which is not present in
Shaw (2007). The presence of adverse selection enhances the negative impact
of corruption on production. Second, even though Shaw (2007) has a dynamic
setup, he does not discuss the effects of corruption on the education system it-
self. Hence, the novel feature presented in this chapter is that corruption has a
dynamic long-term component: the indirect effect. Third, the chapter goes be-
yond qualitative illustrations and offers quantitative results that assess these
channels of corruption. Finally, unlike Shaw (2007), the data used here is not a
(general) corruption index but rather a true measure of educational corruption.
This chapter therefore complements the existing literature in several re-
spects. It is the first paper with both analytical and quantitative implications of
educational corruption. It also adds to the understanding of the links between
institutions and the quality of education. Finally, this chapter emphasizes a
new facet of corruption: its indirect (dynamic) effect on the economy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides empir-
ical background and evidence. Section 2.3 discusses the model, while Section
2.4 characterizes decisions and defines the equilibrium concept of the model.
Section 2.5 presents the calibration and the quantitative results, while section
2.6 tests the robustness of these results. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence
The description of the empirical evidence starts with the available data on
educational corruption. It continues with a discussion of evidence that backs up
the main hypothesis of the paper, which is that educational corruption affects
output through education quality, and, specifically, through a teacher’s effect.
Finally, the relevance of corruption at exit is also shown.
2.2.1 Educational Corruption
A data source for educational corruption is Transparency International’s Global
Corruption Barometer (GCB). The GCB is a survey that assesses public opin-
ion regarding (1) corruption in the public sector, (2) government actions against
corruption, and (3) the evolution of corruption. Respondents are men and
women aged 15+, and the samples are weighted to bring them in line with
national and global populations. According to Transparency International’s
website, “GCB is the only worldwide public opinion survey on perception and
experience of corruption.” A particularity of GCB is that it includes information
about educational corruption. To my knowledge, this rich data set has never
been used in economics literature. The measure of educational corruption that
I use is the proportion of people who paid a bribe in the education sector.8 The
data is available for 80 countries, and I take the average of all data over the
8 A complete description of the GCB can be found at http://www.transparency.org. I use the
proportion of respondents who answered yes to the following question: “In the past 12 months,
have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to each of the following
institution/organization? Education system”. This proportion is in percentages of those, in the
survey, who came in contact with the education system in the past 12 months.
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2006-2008 period. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of this measure of edu-
cational corruption by geographical regions. It can be seen that educational
corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. Africa is the most affected region,
while North America and Western Europe are exceptions, with low levels of
educational corruption. High levels of variability also exist within regions.9
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Constructed Educational Corruption (EC)
Measure
All Africa Cent. East. Middle Asia Cent. South. N. Amer
Countries Europe East America and W. Euro.
Mean, EC (%) 11.91 23.87 9.14 7.89 7.6 7.13 1.34
Std Deviation 8.82 19.73 10.66 8.17 7.95 4.08 0.79
Minimum 0 1 1 1 0 0.33 0.33
Maximum 65 65 38 21 23 13.67 2.67
Notes: EC: mean of available data for the 2006-2008 period of the proportion of persons who had contact with the
education sector and that Paid a Bribe in the Education Sector (GCB, Transparency International).
Africa: Cameroon, Congo (Republic of), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Uganda, and Zambia.
Central European Countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine.
Middle East: Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey.
Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea(Republic of), Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Central and South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay Peru, Romania, and Venezuela.
North America and Western Europe: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United
States.
9 Another piece of evidence of the prevalence of educational corruption, but that’s geograph-
ically more restrictive, comes from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer surveys. The Afrobarometer
“measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa” and is designed for cross-
country comparisons.Round 3 of the Afrobarometer covers 18 countries. One of the questions
it asks is “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?” and
one possible answer is “Teachers and school administrators”. An average of 19% (median of
17%) of the respondents perceive that most or all of the teachers or school administrators are
corrupted.
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2.2.2 Educational Corruption and Output per Capita
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between (ln) output per capita and edu-
cational corruption. The measure of output per capita is constructed from the
series RGDPCH from the Penn World Tables 6.3 described in Heston, Sum-
mers and Aten (2009). We observe a clear negative relationship between the
two variables.10
Figure 2.1: Average (ln) real GDP per capita and educational Corruption
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Table 2.2 investigates the significance and robustness of this negative re-
lationship. To underline the fact that the results are not driven by outliers, I
show only estimates for regressions that do not include the five countries with
more than 35% of respondents reporting a bribe.11 All regressions control for
10 The fitted line is from column 3 of Table 2.2.
11 The outliers that I exclude are Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Gabon, Liberia, and Sierra-Leone.
All estimates and their significance are robust to the introduction of the outliers. The only
regression for which the estimate of educational corruption loses significance includes Gabon
and controls for bureaucratic corruption. I interpret this as a peculiarity of Gabon: an oil-
producing country with a small population.
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Table 2.2: Output Per Capita and Educational Corruption
Dependent Variable: ln Real Gdp per Capita
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Educational Corruption (EC) -0.066 -0.057 -0.030
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Tertiary Education Enrollment 0.008 0.007
(% relevant age ) (0.005) (0.005)
Bureaucratic Corruption -0.022
(0.005)
Intercept 10.501 8.577 9.874
(0.302) (0.093) (0.319)
Countries 75 71 70
R2 0.73 0.744 0.838
Significance levels :  = 10%  = 5%    = 1%
Notes: Huber-White estimated standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include continental dummies.
Definition and Sources:
(ln) Real Gdp per Capita: mean of available series RGDPCH from PWT 6.3 on 1990-2007.
EC: Proportion of persons who had a contact with the education sector and that Paid a Bribe in the Education Sector
(GCB, Transparency International).
Tertiary Education Enrollment : student enrolled in tertiary education as a % of the relevant age group. Means of
available data 1997-2008 (UNESCO).
Bureaucratic Corruption: 10*(10 - mean of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)) 1995-2007 (Transparency In-
ternational). This transformation of the CPI implies that a higher index means that a country is more corrupted.
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regional dummies. For all regressions, I find that educational corruption has a
strong, robust, and significant negative impact on output per capita.
Controlling for a measure of the quantity of skills/human capital (UNESCO’s
percentage of agents in the relevant age range enrolled in tertiary schooling
over the 1997-2008 period) does not alter the significance found in column 1.12
To address the possibility that the measure of educational corruption simply
captures the degree of corruption in a country, I also control for a proxy of
bureaucratic corruption (column 3). This proxy is a (transformed) average Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI) for the 1995-2007 period.13 A striking result
is that educational corruption is still significant after including this proxy, al-
though the estimate declines by half.14
These regressions tell us that an increase of one standard deviation of edu-
cational corruption lowers output per capita by 21% to 45%.15 Thus educational
corruption is an important determinant of lower economic development.16 It is
now shown that educational corruption affects output per capita through the
12 Using data from Barro and Lee (2000) yields similar results. In particular, the significance
and robustness are maintained. I use UNESCO’s data because it covers more countries for
which data for EC is also available. Similar results are obtained when using other levels of
education.
13 The CPI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to ex-
ist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on
corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of indepen-
dent and reputable institutions. CPI data is available at http://www.transparency.org
14 The measures for EC and bureaucratic corruption are not comparable: EC is expressed as
a percentage while the bureaucratic corruption is an index. Hence, from these regressions, one
cannot directly say what kind of corruption is more important.
15 The standard deviation of EC for each regression is 6.83, 6.91 and 6.95, respectively. For
regression 3, for example, we have -0.03  6.95 ' -0.21. This means that if EC increases by one
standard deviation, output per capita falls by 0.21 log points and, therefore, by approximately
21%.
16 It would be interesting to investigate the causality between output and both kinds of
corruption; unfortunately the data does not allow me to do so.
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quality of education.
2.2.3 Educational Corruption, Quality of Schooling, and
Teacher Quality
The literature provides evidence of the key role educational or human capi-
tal quality play on output per capita.17 The model in the current paper gives
teacher quality a role as well. It would be ideal to directly link corruption
to cross-country measures of teacher quality. Unfortunately, this is not possi-
ble. Instead, I follow Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and use International Test
Scores (ITS) as a measure of teacher/schooling quality.18 Figure 2.2 illustrates
the negative relationship between education quality and educational corrup-
tion.19 As shown in Table 2.3, this relationship is significant. The negative
effect of corruption is robust to the introduction of output per capita (column
3) and bureaucratic corruption (column4). Thus educational corruption affects
the quality of education.
Additional evidence links corruption to teacher quality. First, countries
where corruption in the classroom is institutionalized offer a poor environment
and few incentives for teachers. Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann (2007) showed that
17 See for example Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) and Erosa,
Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2010).
18 I transform the raw ITS data for the years 1999, 2003 and 2007 and rely on the same
methodology used by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) to construct their variableQL1. Specifically,
I convert each available performance series to a mean of 50, and, for each country, I take the
weighted average over all available transformed test scores. The weights are the inverse of the
country-specific standard error.
19 The fitted line is from column 3 in Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: Quality of education and educational corruption
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these features are key for teacher effectiveness. Second, Transparency Interna-
tional (2005) pointed out that unqualified individuals who obtained academic
degrees in exchange for bribes are put in positions of authority, and teachers
are no exception. Corruption also affects the schools in which teachers are
trained. For example, Transparency International (2006) reported that the
Teacher Service Commission in Kenya-in charge of establishing and monitor-
ing teaching standards, training, and fitness to teach of prospective teachers
in Kenya-was the second most corrupted institution in the eyes of the Kenyan
public.
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Table 2.3: Quality of Education and Educational Corruption
Dependent Variable: Combined Math and
Science International Test Scores
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Educational Corruption (EC) -0.421 -0.609 -0.414 -0.419
(0.233) (0.256) (0.234) (0.239)
Tertiary Education Enrollment 0.278 0.208 0.169 0.164
(% relevant age ) 0.077 (0.085) (0.092) (0.091)
(ln) Gdp Per Capita 3.804 2.698
(2.957) (4.318)
Bureaucratic Corruption -0.068
(0.249)
Intercept 18.861 40.942 3.735 16.867
(4.191) (6.174) (29.447) (47.298)
Countries 36 34 34 34
R2 0.564 0.567 0.592 0.594
Significance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Notes: Huber-White estimated standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include continental dummies.
Columns 2 to 4 remove the outliers Russia and Ukraine.
Definition and Sources:
Combined Math and Science International Test Scores: See the text.
EC: Proportion of persons who had a contact with the education sector and that Paid a Bribe in the Education Sector
(GCB, Transparency International).
ln Real Gdp per Capita: mean of available series RGDPCH from PWT 6.3 on 1990-2007.
Tertiary Education Enrollment : student enrolled in tertiary education as a % of the relevant age group. Means of
available data 1997-2008 (UNESCO).
Bureaucratic Corruption: 10*(10 - mean of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)) 1995-2007 (Transparency In-
ternational). This transformation of the CPI implies that a higher index means that a country is more corrupted.
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2.2.4 Corruption at Exit
There exist various kinds of educational corruption. This paper focuses on the
buying of grades or diplomas, which can be classified as corruption at exit. Fig-
ure 2.3 illustrates evidence of this form of corruption.20 The top panel shows
that countries with more corruption have lower tertiary schooling completion
rates. The completion rate is a percentage of the relevant age group. When
these completion rates are expressed in percentages of enrollment rates, the
trend is inverted: countries with more educational corruption tend to have
higher completion rates per enrollee.21 This highlights the effect that corrup-
tion at exit might play on the quality of schooling: despite higher graduation
rates per enrollee in corrupted countries, the lower selection metric implied by
corruption lowers the quality of the pool of graduates.
More evidence exists on the buying and selling of grades or diplomas. Cit-
ing UNESCO, Transparency International (2005) reports that the buying and
selling of grades and diplomas is a frequent occurrence, particularly in South-
east Europe and the former Soviet Union. This kind of corruption occurs either
between students and faculty members (bribes in exchange for good grades)
or students and administrators if exams are sold. A recent example is the
scandal that erupted in 2008 at the University of Bari in Italy, where lecturers
20 Both fitted lines are from regressions (STATA command rreg) that control for the mean
real GDP per capita, EC, the proportion of surveyed people who came into contact with the
education system, enrollment in tertiary schooling, and continental dummies.
21 Note that some completion rates in terms of enrollment exceed 100%. This emerges from
the fact that both enrollment and completion rates are expressed in percentages of a theoretical
age group.
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Figure 2.3: Evidence of Corruption at Exit
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were convicted of selling degree exams and theses to economics and finance stu-
dents. A last example is the traffic of diplomas involving hundreds of Chinese
students at the management school of the University of Toulon in France.22
This section has shown that educational corruption, is an important ongoing
phenomenon that deserves more attention from economics literature.
2.3 The Model
In this section, a model of educational corruption is developed. It incorporates
the following main features: the quality of the pool of teachers determines the
creation of skills (or competence); incompetent students can bribe and pretend
they are competent; the presence of incompetent workers affects the quality of
workers and, therefore, alters production and the quality of teachers. Sections
2.5 and 2.6 will assess the impact of both the direct and indirect effects on
production.
The economy is populated by a continuum of two-period lived agents in an
overlapping generations setup. The size (measure) of each generation is nor-
malized to one. Agents evolve in an open economy with an exogenous interest
rate and no mobility. There is a public sector that runs a university and a pri-
vate sector characterized by two activities, skilled and unskilled, to which I
shall return.23 The university has a key role in the economy. First, it devel-
ops skills with some students becoming competent. Competent students are
22 Source: Le Monde, April 16, July 29, and October 19, 2009.
23 Although the model discusses publicly funded universities, corruption may also affect
private universities. Unfortunately, the data does not allow me to examine the relationships
between the institutional features of universities and corruption.
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those who acquired skills that make them productive in the public sector and
in the skilled occupation of the private sector. The incompetent workers are
productive only in the unskilled occupation. A second role for the university
is to implement a screening technology (i.e., diplomas), which is, in principle,
attributed to competency. Finally, the central assumption of the model is that
the university is corruptible. Hence, it is possible for incompetent students to
obtain a diploma if they bribe the university.24 Corruption, therefore, induces
two effects on the economy. First, when incompetent people get a diploma,
this directly changes the value of the diploma and generates an adverse selec-
tion problem that affects production. Second, it alters the quality of the pool
of teachers and indirectly (or, dynamically) affects the likeliness of becoming
competent.
2.3.1 The Agents
Agents are heterogenous with respect to wealth (!) and innate ability (), both
of which are observable at birth by the agent. The distribution of wealth and
ability are time invariant in the population such that each generation is born
identical in terms of its wealth and innate ability.25 I further assume that
agents are credit constrained.
Agents decide on whether to work or go to university (automatically), which
24 Note that in the real world, however, competent students might be required to bribe to
receive grades or diplomas they do indeed deserve. Allowing this feature would not affect the
qualitative results presented here, it would only reinforce the mechanisms.
25 Having the agents not observing their ability at birth but, rather, a noisy signal of ability
gives similar results. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate endogenous distribu-
tions of wealth or ability, but this complicates the model without much gain, and requires one
to make assumptions about the evolution of both across generations.
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implies giving up wage earnings. Those who decide to start working immedi-
ately, work as unskilled workers in a private firm their entire life and earn wL
each period. Those who decide to attend university, pay a direct cost ce and
faces a probability p(; Qt) of becoming competent, with Qt 2 [0; 1] the (equilib-
rium) quality of the pool of teachers at time t. I thus consider that the creation
of competence is a function of both student ability and the quality of the pool
of teachers. Ability only matters in university: wages, which are conditional
on occupation, are independent of it. If the students become competent, they
get a diploma and work either in the skilled occupation or in the public sector
in the second period. If they become incompetent, they must decide whether to
participate in corruption and buy a diploma or drop out and work as unskilled
workers. Corruption takes the form of an exogenous bribe b that “guarantees”
a diploma to its payer.26
It is assumed that the government is able to screen/fire a fraction PS of its
incompetent workers. Similarly, firms are able to screen/fire a fraction F of
the incompetent workers in the skilled occupation. I assume that PS < F;
this assumption is motivated by two facts. First, the absence of profit motives
and competition among workers in government activities makes it harder to
screen those who are incompetent. Second, the firing process is usually more
difficult in the public sector due to collective bargaining agreements, and other
regulations.27 Let t be the (anticipated) probability, at time t, that a graduate
26 Having an endogenous bribe in this framework would considerably complicate the model.
For instance, the expectations over being a public servant would be affected and would require
further assumptions to characterize the model.
27 For the role of unions on teachers’ wages in the United States, see Gilpin and Kaganovich
(2009). Related to that point, Wo¨ßmann (2000) found a negative effect of teacher unions on
student performance.
26
incompetent student earns the skilled wage in time t + 1. In other words, t
is the ex ante probability that an incompetent agent with a diploma will work
in the public or in the skilled private occupation without being caught. If we
let t be the (ex ante) probability to work in the public sector, it follows that
t  1  tPS   (1  t)F .
2.3.2 The Representative Firm
The private sector consists of a representative firm that uses skilled and un-
skilled workers as distinct inputs. The production function is inspired by Cau-
cutt and Kumar (2003) and takes the following form:
Yt = A [AH (NH;t + NL;t)
 + AL (NL;t + NH;t)
]
1=
, Yt = A

AH
 
NCH;t +N
I
H;t  0 + NL;t

+ AL
 
NL;t + (N
C
H;t +N
I
H;t  0)
1=
;
where A is TFP, AH + AL = 1,  < 1,  > 0;  < 1 and   , NH;t de-
notes the number of agents with a diploma that are employed as skilled by
the firm. The quantity NH;t is composed of N IH;t incompetent workers who have
not been caught and NCH;t competent workers. NL;t denotes the number of un-
skilled agents employed by the firm; it is composed of agents who did not enter
university, of university dropouts, and of incompetents workers with diplomas
who had been caught.
As formulated by Caucutt and Kumar (2003), one can think of the first and
second terms in the bracket as “brain” and “brawn”, respectively. Competent
workers are the primary suppliers of “brain” (hence  < 1), and both types of
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workers contribute to “brawn”. Incompetent workers are unable to solve com-
plex tasks, and thus they produce 0 (hence, N IH;t 0) in brain activity. They are
also unproductive in brawn activity as they miss specific skills. For instance,
the role of college graduates in the brawn activity could be to manage workers
or solve tasks that unskilled workers cannot.28 The contribution of unskilled
workers to brain activity is smaller than the skilled category’s contribution to
brawn activity (hence,   ). The parameter  controls the elasticity of substi-
tution between the two activities.
Wages are determined in equilibrium and are just the marginal product of
competent and unskilled workers. Denote the wage for the unskilled (or Low-
skill) jobs as wL;t and the wage for the skilled (or High-skill) jobs as wH;t, it
follows that
wH;t = A


AH (NH;t + NL;t)
 1 + AL (NL;t + NH;t)
 1Y 1 t ; (2.1)
wL;t = A


AH (NH;t + NL;t)
 1 + AL (NL;t + NH;t)
 1Y 1 t : (2.2)
2.3.3 The University and the Creation of Skills
As stated before, the main role of the public sector in this model is to run the
university, and all public servants are hired from the pool of graduates. The
size of the public sector during period t, NPS;t, is exogenously set to a fraction z
28 The idea of having different types of problems in the production function comes from
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004). They analyzed the interactions between workers and
the organizational aspect of the interactions. In their setup, the aggregate production result
in applying production time to tasks faced by agents. The agents differ in their ability to solve
tasks: they solve them and produce or they are not able to solve them and require the help of
a manager who either solves them or does not. Thus, without the necessary skills, production
is zero.
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of the population not in school. The public sector in period t, NPS;t, is composed
of NCPS;t competent agents and N
I
PS;t incompetent agents. It is assumed that the
government can screen/fire only a fraction PS of the incompetent agents hired
in the public sector. For convenience, government wages are always set exactly
equal to the skilled wage.29
I define the quality of the public sector as the fraction of competent workers
among public servants. Formally,
Qt (t) 
NCPS;t
NPS;t
;
where t denotes the aggregate state of the economy, which will be defined
below. I further assume that the quality of the pool of teachers is the same
as the overall quality of the pool of public servants. This simple assumption
allows me to be agnostic about other government activities.30
It is assumed that the probability of becoming competent is a function of
both innate ability  and the quality of the pool of teachers Q (t). There are
several ways to model this relationship, and I investigate other specifications
in Section 2.6.31 The preferred probability function takes the form
p (; Q(t)) =  + (1  ) Q (t) ; (2.3)
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that weights the respective importance of in-
nate ability and the quality of teachers. Thus student ability and educational
29 This assumption allows me to characterize decisions.
30 It should be noted that Qt can be interpreted as the quality of the whole educational
system. With such an interpretation, the model is consistent with the idea that corruption
affects all levels of education. In this respect, it is possible to write a model that explicitly
distinguishes between different levels of education. However, calibrating such a model would
require refined data such as information on corruption at each level of education.
31 In particular, I investigate a Cobb Douglas specification Q (t)
1 .
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quality interact positively and, more specifically, the incidence of teacher qual-
ity on competence depends on one’s innate ability. In other words, better stu-
dents make better use of the quality of their teachers. This complementarity
has received support from the literature. Gilpin and Kaganovich (2009), for in-
stance, constructed a model where more able students derive greater benefits
from higher quality education; the authors depict this as an “ability premium”.
In his model of educational corruption, Shaw (2007), required a probability
function for prospective students to become managers (i.e., skilled agents). He
considered a specification that allows for an interaction between ability and
bribes. The incidence of bribes in his setup can easily be interpreted as a re-
flection of the quality of the education system. Furthermore, in Bishop and
Wo¨ßmann (2004), students’ educational performance is a combination of effort,
innate ability, and, notably, the institutional features of the schooling system in
which teachers evolve. These institutional features are related to educational
quality as they shape teachers’ incentives and ability to influence the education
process.
Equation (2.3) further captures the dynamic long-term impacts of corrup-
tion. The first impact is that economies with better quality teachers will, ce-
teris paribus, produce more competent students. A second effect pertains to
the decision that agents make: with lower quality teachers, agents might de-
cide not to go to school at all since they do not learn much.32 Finally, lower
quality teachers render corruption more likely and affect constrained people
32 These effects are similar to the ones from quiet corruption in the education sector as
depicted in World Bank (2010). This underlines the close relationship between the concept of
educational corruption depicted in this paper and the World Bank’s quiet corruption.
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more. The sequence of events for an agent born at the beginning of period t is
given below:
1. Given ability , wealth !, the aggregate state t, and the wages (current
and future), the agent decides whether to enter university. She earns
wL (t) if she does not enter university.
2. Just before the end of period t, the agent becomes competent with proba-
bility p (;Qt).
 If the agent fails and bribes the university, she has an ex ante proba-
bility t to work in the public sector in period t+1. If caught, she goes
to the private skilled activity where she faces another probability of
getting caught. On the other hand, if she does not bribe, she drops
out and works as an unskilled worker in the private sector in period
t+ 1.
 If the agent is competent, she earns the diploma and works in the
public or the private skilled occupation in period t+ 1.
3. At the beginning of period t+1, the quality of teachers Q (t+1), the wages
wH (t+1) and wL (t+1), and the probabilities (t+1 and t+1) are updated.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the decision tree a student faces if she fails at the exam-
ination.
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Figure 2.4: Decision tree of a student who fails at examination.
Incompetent 
Student 
Bribes and gets 
a diploma 
Hired By 
Government 
Caught, fired by 
the government  
Hired by a firm as  
Unskilled, earns 
Not caught, 
earns   
Not hired by 
Government  
Hired by a firm as 
skilled  
Not caught, 
earns    
Caught, earns 
 
Does not Bribe 
and drops out 
Hired by a firm as 
Unskilled, earns  
Results Decision to bribe, 
diploma delivered   
Government and firms hire given diploma 
status and screen incompetent workers 
2.3.4 Value Functions
Aggregate quantities and value functions are described next. Let NEt , NDt and
NGt denote the number of agents who enter university, who drop out, and who
graduate, respectively, at the beginning of period t. The graduate students are
composed of NCt competent students and N It incompetent students who paid for
their diplomas (i.e NCt +N It = NGt ).33
Formally, the size of the public sector is
NPS;t = z (2 NEt );
33 It should be clear that NGt = NEt 1   NDt i.e the number of graduates in time t is equal to
the number of entrants from t   1 minus the dropouts of time t. The dropouts are the failing
students that do not to participate in corruption.
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with z an exogenous fraction.34
These (equilibrium) quantities together with the direct cost (ce), the bribe
level (b), firm interventions (F), and government intervention (PS) define the
aggregate state for this economy as t 
 
ce; b; PS; F; N
E
t ; N
D
t ; N
G
t ; N
C
t ; NPS;t

.
Finally, let  be the inter-temporal discount factor. The value of not attending
university becomes:
VNU (!;t;t+1)  ln (! + wL (t)) +  ln (wL (t+1)) : (2.4)
The agent earns a wage wL (t) in each period as she works in the unskilled
occupation. Note that this value function is independent of ability. If an agent
attends university, she becomes competent with a probability p (; Q) and has
the following value function:
VU (; !;t;t+1)  p (;Qt) VCpt (!;t;t+1) + (1  p (;Qt))VFail (!;t;t+1) ;
(2.5)
with VCpt and VFail representing the value functions of being a competent stu-
dent or of failing, respectively. Formally, this gives
VCpt (!;t;t+1)  ln (!   ce) +  ln (wH (t+1)) ; (2.6)
where, in the first period, the student consumes her wealth minus the cost
of education ce and, in the second period, she works in the public or private
sector, earning the skilled wage wH (t+1). If the student fails, she must decide
whether to bribe the university and receives the utility
VFail (!;t;t+1)  max fVDrop (!;t;t+1) ; VIncpt (!;t;t+1)g ; (2.7)
34 When I calibrate the model, this fraction is obtained from the data and is country specific.
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where VDrop and VIncpt are the values that represent dropping out and bribing,
respectively. We have
VDrop (!;t;t+1) = ln (!   ce) +  ln (wL (t+1)) ; (2.8)
and
VIncpt (!;t;t+1) = U(Bribe in Period1)+ : : :
+ f(Prob. Work in Government  Prob. Not caught) U(skilled wage)g
+ f(Prob. Work In Firm  Prob. Not caught) U(skilled wage)g
+ f (Prob. Work in Government  Prob. Caught) U(Unskilled wage)g
+ f (Prob. Work In Firm  Prob. Caught) U(Unskilled wage)g
VIncpt (!;t;t+1) = ln (!   ce   b) +  [ ln (wH (t+1)) + (1  ) ln (wL (t+1))]
(2.9)
If an incompetent student does not bribe (equation (2.8)), she drops out,
joins the low occupation, and earns wL (t+1) in the second period. If she decides
to bribe, she pays an amount b and has a probability  to be employed as a
skilled worker without being caught. Recall that t  1 tPS  (1 t)F with
t  max
n
NIPS;t
N It
; 1
o
, the ex ante probability that an incompetent graduate is
hired in the public sector.35 An incompetent student bribes only if VIncpt yields
a higher utility than VDrop. Finally, an agent enters university simply if VU
yields more utility than VNU.
35 In principle one could set t equal to
NPS;t
NGt
(i.e., the expected probability that a college
graduate is hired in the public sector). I do not use this formulation because, in the framework,
competent agents are indifferent when it comes to working in the public or private sectors,
unlike incompetent agents.
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2.4 Characterization
Next, the model is formally analyzed. Although, it is not possible to solve the
full model analytically, one can characterize the agents’ behaviour. There are
two major decisions in the model: (1) whether or not to enter university, and
(2) whether or not to bribe if one fails the examination. These decisions can
be characterized with backward induction. For notational sake, the probability
that an agent becomes competent is rewritten as p(;Q)  	 with 	  +(1 
)Q. Also, the aggregate state and time subscripts are not carried over.
2.4.1 Agents’ Decision to Bribe and to Enter University
At the end of the first period, the failing students decide whether or not to
bribe. Formally, a failing student with wealth ! would bribe if VIncpt(!;) 
VDrop(!;). This leads to a first proposition for those who enter university.
Proposition 1. Given a level of bribe b, government and firm screening/firing
efficiency PS and F, respectively, there exists a cutoff !(ce; b; PS; F; ; wLwH ) 
ce +
b
1 

wL
wH
 , such that:
 all failing students with wealth ! participate in corruption if and only if
!  ! (ce; b; PS; F; ); and
 other failing students do not participate in corruption and dropout.
Furthermore, !(ce; b; PS; F; ; wLwH ) is increasing in ce, b, PS, F and decreasing
in  and the skilled wage premium wH
wL
.
35
The details of the proof are in Appendix A. All effects are intuitive. As bribes
become more expensive, and similarly, as government or firm screening be-
comes more effective, fewer agents find it in their interests to pay for a diploma.
Easier access to government jobs, however, renders corruption more attractive.
Hence, in more corrupted countries (countries with low b, PS, and F or high
), incompetent students will be induced to bribe. Proposition 1, therefore, im-
plies that the quality of graduates (and hence of workers) would be affected by
corruption as the selection metric is bypassed by wealthy incompetent agents.
I abuse notation and rewrite !() where  is the aggregate state vector defined
earlier. I henceforth define those with wealth above !() as the “rich” and the
others as the “poor”.
At the beginning of the first period, given ! () and p(; Q) the probability
that an agent with ability  becomes competent, agents decide whether or not
to enter university. Typically, agents with ability  and wealth ! will enter
university if VU (; !;) is greater than VNU (; !;). This leads to a second
proposition.
Proposition 2. Given decision rule ! (), there exists cutoffs of ability
P (!; ce; b; PS; F; ;
wH
wL
; Q)  ln(
!+wL
! ce )
	 ln

wH
wL
 and
R(!; b; F; PS; ;
wH
wL
; Q)  ln(
!+wL
! ce b) 

ln
wH
wL

	
h
ln( ! ce! ce b)+(1 ) ln

wH
wL
i such that
 Agents with wealth ! < ! () (the poor) would enter university if and only
if   P (:); and
 Agents with wealth !  ! () (the rich) would enter university if and only
if   R (:).
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Furthermore,
 R (:) < P (:);
 P (:) is decreasing in ! and Q. However the partial effect of b, F, PS and
 are nil; and
 R (:) is decreasing in !,  and Q and increasing in b, F and PS.
The details of the proof are in Appendix A. Proposition 2 establishes cutoffs
of ability for optimal decisions for education. The cutoffs depend on how the
agent anticipates the bribing decision in the event she fails. Note that the cut-
off for the rich is lower than that of the poor, and that both cutoffs decrease in
wealth ! and teacher quality Q. Hence, wealth and a better quality of teach-
ers induce more students to enroll. Because the poor anticipate that they will
not bribe, their cutoff is not affected by the bribe level b, firm and government
screenings (’s) and market tightness . The cutoff for the rich, on the other
hand, increases in the size of b and in the ’s. In other words, ceteris paribus,
in corrupted countries, wealthy individuals with low ability may go to college
since they know ahead of time that they will bribe the university if they fail.
Proposition 2 illustrates a dichotomy that emerges because of corruption: a
corrupted education system implies that the rich and the poor implicitly face
different kinds of constraints, which affect their decision to develop skills. It
reveals the long-term consequence of corruption on the quality of the pool of
students. Let b^ (!;) and d^ (!; ;) denote the optimal policy rules induced
by Propositions 1 (decision over bribing) and 2 (decision over university atten-
dance), respectively.
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2.4.2 University Aggregates
Using Propositions 1 and 2, one can derive expressions for the number of en-
trants (NE), graduates (NG), competent agents (NC), and incompetent agents
(N I) in the economy. NE is the sum of agents, rich or poor, whose ability ex-
ceeds the respective cutoffs. Because rich incompetent agents are able to bribe,
they obtain a diploma; NG is thus the sum of all rich students and only poor
competent students. The total number of competent agents NC is the sum of
competent students, rich or poor, who entered university. Finally, the number
of incompetent students is the difference between the number of graduates and
the number of competent students. Appendix B shows how these expressions
are derived. For notational sake, the aggregate state variable  is not carried
over. Let f() and g(!) denote the probability distributions of  and ! on [0; 1]
and [0; !max] respectively; both distributions are assumed to be uniform. Recall
that the probability to become competent is p(;Q) = 	. It follows that
NE = 1  1
!max
Z !
0
P (!) d! +
Z !max
!
R(!) d!

; (2.10)
NG = 1  1
!max

!(
	
2
Z !
0
2P (!) d! +
Z !max
!
R(!) d!

; (2.11)
ND = NE  NG; (2.12)
NC = 1  	
2!max
Z !
0
2P (!) d! +
Z !max
!
2R(!) d!

; (2.13)
N I = NG  NC: (2.14)
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2.4.3 Labour Market
The aggregate quantities pertaining to the labour market are now derived. The
public sector hires from the pool of graduates and so do firms for their skilled
occupation. Public sector employment has already been discussed above so we
are left with the private sector.
All competent students who have not been hired by the government are
employed as skilled by a firm. Only a fraction (1   F) of the incompetent
graduates without a job become employed in the skilled occupation, the others
become unskilled workers. The group of unskilled workers is thus composed of
agents who do not enter university, dropouts, and incompetent graduates who
have been caught.36 The labour market is summarized by the equations below.
For the public sector,
The size of the Public sector:NPS = z (2 NE) (2.15)
Incompetent in the Public sector:N IPS = min

(1  PS)N I; NPS
	
(2.16)
Competent in the Public sector:NCPS = max

NPS  N IPS; NC
	
(2.17)
For the firms we further have
Competent in the Firm:NCH = N
C  NCPS (2.18)
Incompetent in the Firm:N IH = (1  F)(NC  NCPS) (2.19)
Workers Employed as Skilled by the Firm:NH = N IH +N
C
H (2.20)
Workers Employed as Unskilled by the Firm:NL = 2(1 NE) + (NE  NG) +N I
(2.21)
36 Note that those who do not enter university are either young or old agents, whereas in-
competent graduates are old.
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The concept of equilibrium can now be defined.
2.4.4 Steady State Competitive Equilibrium
Given distributions of endowment (!) and ability (), an exogenous size of the
public sector relative to the active population (z), a probability of becoming com-
petent (p(;Q)), and government and firm screening/firing efficiency (PS and
F, respectively), a steady state competitive equilibrium for this economy is a col-
lection of decision rules (d^ (!; ;) and b^ (!;)), educational aggregate quanti-
ties (NE; ND; NG; NC; N I), labour aggregate quantities (NPS; N IPS; N
C
PS; NH ; N
I
H ; N
C
H ; NL),
quality of teachers (Q ()) and prices (wL () and wH () with
   ce; b; PS; F; NE; NG; NC; NPS) such that:
 An incompetent graduate has a probability   1  PS   (1  )F to be
employed as skilled with   max
n
NIPS
N I
; 1
o
.
 b^ (!;) and d^ (!; ;) satisfy Propositions 1 and 2. Specifically,
– Given wH (), wL () and , the decision rule b^ (!;) solves the cor-
ruption decision problem of the incompetent (2.7).
– Given wH (), wL (), p(;Q) and b^ (!;), the decision rule d^ (!; ;)
solves the university attendance decision (2.5).
 Educational aggregate quantities are consistent with individuals’ deci-
sions; that is, NE, ND, NG, NC and N I satisfy equations (2.10) to (2.14).
 The labour market clears. Specifically, NPS, N IPS, NCPS, NCH , N IH , NH , and
NL satisfy equations (2.15)to (2.21).
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 The quality of teachers is equal to Q  NCPS
NPS
.
 Given wages, the firm maximizes profits. That is, wL () and wH () sat-
isfy (2.2) and (2.1).
2.5 Quantitative Experiments
In this section, the quantitative importance of the direct and indirect chan-
nels of educational corruption are assessed. In particular, the assessment uses
counterfactual experiments that evaluate what happens when each channel is
sequentially shut down. First, the model described above is calibrated. Then,
using the same parameters, economies free of each channel are sequentially
recomputed. The comparisons between different scenarios assess the loss in
output induced by these channels. Table 2.4 summarizes the data used for the
quantitative exercise; details on the data can be found in Appendix C. The
experiments are based on 25 countries.37
2.5.1 Calibrating the Economy
Strategy
The calibration strategy is guided by a desire to broadly match model predic-
tions of educational corruption, university enrollment, university graduates,
37 Unfortunately, the most corrupted countries are under-represented in the quantitative
exercise. This is mostly due to the lack of comprehensive data on the size of their public sector.
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Table 2.4: Description of the Data
Source Period Interpretation
Data (means) in the Model
Gross Completion Ratio UNESCO 1997-2008 NG
Gross Enrolment Ratio UNESCO 1997-2008 NE
Output per Capita PWT 6.3 (CGDP series) 1990-2007 Ay
% of People who Paid a Transparency International 2006 - 2008 N
I
NE
Bribe in Education Sector (GCB Barometer)
Skilled Wage Premia Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) 1990 - 2003 wH
wL
(1) Employment by Level of Education International Labour Office 1990-2007
(2) Total Active Population Aged 15+ International Labour Office 1990-2007 (1)(2)(3): z
(3) Public Sector Employment International Labour Office 1990-2006
Notes:
(1)(2): Share of the Total Active Population with College Education
(1)(2)(3): Fraction of Active Population with College Education Working in the Public Sector z and, in the Model,
NPS = z (2 NE).
and skilled wage premia with individual country data. The data on the per-
centage of respondents who paid a bribe in the education sector is taken as the
equivalent to the model’s proportion of students who pay a bribe.38
The model has 11 parameters that need to be calibrated: one utility param-
eter (); five production parameters (A, , , , and AH or AL); three university
parameters (, ce, and b); and two screening/firing parameters (PS and F).
The generational discount factor is set at  = 0:82, which corresponds to a
yearly discount factor of 0.98 compounded over 10 years. The benchmark pa-
rameters for production, except for the TFP (discussed below), are taken from
38 This is equivalent to assuming that, in the data, individuals who pay a bribe in the edu-
cation sector are all incompetent students.
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Caucutt and Kumar (2003). These authors calibrated the production function
for the U.S. in a model that has similar features to the model presented here:
an OLG two-period model with a decision over college attendance and a prob-
ability to drop out. This has the advantage of providing a nice benchmark for
the analysis. Thus, the elasticity of substitution () is set equal to 0:35; the
share of skilled workers in the unskilled activity () is set equal to 0:1, and the
share of unskilled workers in the skilled activity () is set to 0:02. Finally, the
TFP (A) is a pure scale parameter used to normalize individual countries per
capita output to their level in the data.39
Ability and wealth distributions are assumed to be uniform, and the util-
ity function is U(c) = ln(c). The parameter  controlling the incidence of the
quality of teachers in the probability of becoming competent is set to 0:5 for the
benchmark analysis. Table 2.5 summarizes the benchmark parameters.
Table 2.5: Parameters
Variable Interpretation Value
Production  Controls the Degree of Elasticity of Substitution 0.35
From Caucutt and Kumar AH Coeff. Associated with Brain Activity 0.5
(2003) AL Coeff. associated with Brawn Activity 0.5
 Share Skilled in Brawn Activity 0.1
 Share Unskilled in Brain Activity 0.02
Education F () Distribution of Ability F () = 
p(;Q) Probability of Being Competent p(;Q) = 0:5 + 0:5Q
Miscellaneous  (Generational) Inter-Temporal Discount Factor (0:98)10 ' 0:817
G(!) Distribution of Wealth G(!) = !
39 Total output in the model consists of private production (equation (2.1)) plus the govern-
ment’s value added, where the latter is evaluated at its cost (salaries).
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The aforementioned parameters (except of course, TFP) are common to all
countries. The remaining four parameters (ce, b, PS, and F) are country spe-
cific.40 They are calibrated to minimize a country-specific sum of weighted
squared differences between moments from the model and the data. The cho-
sen moments are the percentage of respondents who paid a bribe (as a percent-
age of enrollment), university attendance and completion rates, and skilled
wage premia. These moments are chosen because they critically depend on
the parameters. Enrollment is not only a function of the cost of education, but
also of the expectations prospective students make about failure at the exam-
ination; these expectations are affected by the bribe level and the screening
technology. Obviously, the percentage of respondents who pay a bribe and, con-
sequently, the number of graduates, depends on both the size of the bribe and
the screening technology. Finally, the skilled wage premia motivate participa-
tion in corruption as well as reflect the scarcity of skills among graduates.
Results
All the results from the calibration can be found in Appendix D. Figure D.1
illustrates the goodness of fit of the calibration exercise. In each panel, the di-
agonal corresponds to a perfect fit. Overall, the benchmark model fits the data
fairly well. This is particularly true for university attendance and the propor-
tion of students paying a bribe. However, the model tends to overestimate the
40 There are, therefore six parameters common to all countries, four parameters that are
calibrated for each country (i.e., 254 calibrated parameters in total) and 25 country-specific
TFPs.
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number of graduates and underestimate the skilled wage premia.41 The cal-
ibrated parameters are collected in Table D.1 where countries are ranked in
ascending order of corruption. What does the model predict?
The first set of predictions relates to the effects of corruption on the edu-
cation system. Because of the lack of data on educational corruption, these
intuitive results are of interest. The top panels of Figure D.2 show that the
number of incompetent graduates increases (top left panel) and the quality of
the pool of graduates decreases (top right panel) with the degree of corruption.
This lower quality graduate pools in corrupted countries leads to a lower qual-
ity of teacher pool, as measured by the fraction of competent workers among
public servants (bottom left panel). It is established that the most corrupted
countries (the countries with more than 10% of their students paying a bribe)
have a teacher quality that is only 69% of the quality of other countries.42 Such
a low quality of teachers has dramatic implications for the creation of knowl-
edge, as depicted in the bottom right panel for three levels of innate ability. For
example, a student with the highest ability level (=1) has only an 80% proba-
bility of becoming competent in the most corrupted countries. In comparison,
this probability is close to 100% in the least corrupted countries.
The second set of predictions concerns the labour market and production.
On one hand, the fraction of incompetent graduates working in the public sec-
tor increases with corruption. On the other hand, the fraction of incompetent
41 The skilled wage premia increase with the degree of corruption, which is consistent with
Shaw (2007) who illustrated the positive relationship that exists in the data between corrup-
tion and returns to education. An intuition for this result is that competence is scarce (and
thus more valuable) in countries where educational corruption is prevalent.
42 The mean quality for the most corrupted countries is 0.62 versus 0.90 for the remaining
countries.
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graduates working in the skilled private occupation remains constant (top pan-
els of Figure D.3). We can also see that TFP (relative to the U.S. TFP) falls with
corruption (bottom panel of Figure D.3).43 This is consistent with the idea that
the level of technology is higher in countries with less educational corruption.
The model, therefore, captures important qualitative and quantitative features
of the world and can be used to run experiments.
2.5.2 Experiments
Description
The broad objective of this subsection is to quantitatively assess the loss in out-
put induced by each channel of educational corruption. This goal is achieved
through numerical simulations-by comparing the effects of four alternative pol-
icy interventions on output per capita. All experiments rely on the parameters
calibrated above.
In the first three experiments, I mimic the effects of unanticipated changes
in the economic environment. Formally, the calibrated measures and the com-
position of enrolled students are maintained; in other words, experiments one
to three start with the (country-specific) measures NE that have been previ-
ously calibrated. However, depending on the nature of the experiments, the
number and the composition of graduates, the employment aggregates and the
43 Recall that TFP is a scale factor that matches individual country output predictions (from
the model) to output (from the data). I simply divide each country’s TFP by the U.S. TFP to
obtain a TFP relative to the U.S.
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composition of skills may change. In the last experiment, a fully dynamic ad-
justment of the economy is implemented: agents are allowed to anticipate the
changes and update their expectations accordingly.
The first experiment assesses the loss in output induced by the presence
of incompetent workers (the direct effect). This loss is identified by banning
incompetent workers from the skilled private occupation. Specifically, I keep
track of the equilibrium quantities and compositions of NE and NG, and I fix
the employment aggregates and the skill composition by sector. However, N IH ,
the measure of incompetent workers in the private sector, is set to 0. It should
be noted that this experiment is equivalent to a partial equilibrium response of
imposing F = 1 while holding agents’expectations over entrance and corrup-
tion equal to their (pre-policy) levels.
The second experiment assesses the loss in output induced by the presence
of incompetent teachers (the direct effect). I consider economies that have no
incompetent teachers, yet still have incompetent workers in the skilled private
sector. Specifically, from the calibrated economy, I keep track of the agents
who enter university, and using these same agents, I recompute the model by
setting Q = 1.44 NE therefore remains unchanged, but NG and the quality of
the pool of graduates may change. In particular, with better quality of teachers,
more competent graduates emerge from university, and production changes.
44 In the second experiment, I do not actually ban incompetent workers from working in the
public sector; I simply set Q = 1. One can interpret this as having no incompetent teachers
while other public activities have incompetent workers. Furthermore, I assume that the com-
petent graduates who come in excess of the calibrated values do not mechanically replace the
now missing incompetent workers in the public sector. I thus assume that the excess competent
graduates are all assigned to production.
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The third experiment combines the first and second experiments. Specif-
ically, I set Q = 1 and impose that there are no incompetent workers in the
skilled private occupation.45
The interpretation of these changes in endogenous variables requires ex-
planation. I am interested in gauging the effects of corruption on output that
emerge exclusively because of incompetent workers (experiment 1) and the
quality of teachers (experiment 2). In experiment 2, for example, by start-
ing with the same NE and imposing Q = 1, I can exactly identify the role of
teacher quality: using the same agents, it tells us what is the potential gain
that results from better teachers.46 These experiments mimic unanticipated
changes in the economic environment and can, therefore, be thought of as my-
opic or partially dynamic experiments. In the next experiment, on the other
hand, agents take such changes into account, making it possible to assess the
fully dynamic effects of corruption.
In the last experiment, I start with an environment similar to that of experi-
ment 3 (i.e., no direct or indirect effects); I further ban corruption and allow the
number of agents entering university to vary.47 Therefore, in this experiment,
agents anticipate that there is no corruption and update their expectations ac-
cordingly. Comparing outcomes of all four experiments assesses the partial and
full losses in output induced by the direct and indirect channels of educational
45 Note that the third experiment does not correspond to perfect screening because incompe-
tent public servants are allowed to work in activities other than education.
46 A partial equilibrium effect (i.e., imposing PS = 1 in the government while holding PS
fixed in agents’ expectations) would correspond to a slightly different experiment since not all
public servants are teachers.
47 To be specific, I use the features of experiment 3 (i.e., F = 1 and Q = 1) and rely on its
wages as the starting wages. Moreover, I impose that there is no corruption and that PS = 1.
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corruption.
Results and Discussion
The gains in output per capita from each experiment are calculated as a per-
centage of the calibrated model output. Figure 2.5 illustrates these gains for
each country and Table 2.6 breaks these gains down by levels of corruption.
First, we can see that for all experiments, the most corrupted countries
always benefit more from the removal of channels of corruption; this is intu-
itive. A second key result is that the losses in output induced by the indirect
channel outweigh those induced by the direct channel. In other words, the dy-
namic effect of educational corruption is more important than the static effect.
Hence, the most corrupted countries could gain, on average, close to 9% in GDP
per capita if the partially dynamic channel was removed whereas this number
would be only 0.7% for the direct effect (Table 2.6). In other words, the losses
in output per capita induced by the feedback channel are more than ten times
as large as the ones induced by the direct channel. Furthermore, the gains
that result from removing both channels of educational corruption (column 3)
emerge, almost entirely, because of the removal of the feedback channel.
Finally, removing corruption (column 4) induces bigger gains in output. It
is also important to note that the gains increase with the incidence of educa-
tional corruption; in particular, the countries that suffer the most from corrup-
tion could gain, on average, 22% in output. Column 4 therefore highlights the
burden that educational corruption imposes on economies.
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Figure 2.5: Gains in output
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Note: The fully dynamic effect of removing educational corruption in Azerbaidjan (39.6%) is
not shown.
Table 2.6: Gains Resulting from the Removal of Each Channel of Corruption
(%)
Country Categories Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
By % of People Removing the Removing the Removing Removing the
Bribing in Education Direct Effect Indirect Effect Both Effects Fully Dynamic
(Data) Effects
Less than 5% 0.075 0.633 0.706 0.812
5 to 10% 0.168 4.547 4.665 5.366
More than 10% 0.736 8.731 9.198 21.926
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The impact of the feedback channel is consistent with evidence from the lit-
erature on the long-term impact of education. The feedback channel could, for
example, partially explain why Pritchett (2001) was concerned about low rates
of growth of output per worker despite increases in education attainment. Fur-
thermore, as a key element of educational quality, the feedback channel story
corroborates cross-country evidence on the quantitative importance of educa-
tion/human capital quality [Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) and Erosa, Kore-
shkova, and Restuccia (2010)] and also micro-evidence on the role of teacher
quality [Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann (2007)]. Finally, the impact of incompe-
tent teachers is hard to dissociate from another issue described in World Bank
(2010), which is the fact that teachers may be exerting low efforts. Hence, the
issue might not just be competence but also shirking. Both phenomena affect
the creation of skills but, likely imply different policies as they mix elements
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Understanding the nuance between the
two deserves further attention.
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
The robustness of the results are now investigated. In particular, the validity
of the results is tested for different values of key parameter, and for modified
assumptions about the production function of human capital.
Table 2.7 reports the results when the degree of elasticity of substitution
() and the parameter controlling the incidence of the quality of teachers on
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the production of human capital () are sequentially modified. All other pa-
rameters remain at their benchmark values. Only the gains resulting from the
removal of the feedback channel are shown since these are the main findings
of the paper. Even though the gains change slightly, the key results are robust
to changes in the values of parameters.48
Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis of  and 
Country Categories Experiment 2: No Indirect Effect (in %)
By % People Bribing  
in Education (Data) Benchmark 0:2 0:5 0:3 0:7
Less than 5% 0.633 0.822 0.224 0.889 0.3
5 to 10% 4.547 5.897 3.365 6.435 3.124
More than 10% 8.731 9.817 7.734 13.128 5.657
Notes: Benchmark values:  = 0:35 and  = 0:5.
For the most corrupted countries, when the elasticity of substitution be-
tween competent workers and unskilled workers is low (=0.2), the impact of
the feedback effect is larger than in the benchmark. Similarly, when the role
of the quality of teachers is more important ( = 0:3), the gains resulting from
the removal of the indirect channel increase.
The next sensitivity analysis deals with the production function of human
capital. Specifically, I modify the specification of the production of human cap-
ital (equation (2.3)) and test the validity of the previous results by using the
48 The other experiments, not reported here, are also consistent with the benchmark
analysis.
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following Cobb Douglas specification:
p (; Q()) = Q ()1  ; (2.22)
Again, the results are not significantly different (Table 2.8).
Table 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis of the Production of Human Capital
Country Categories Experiment 2: No Indirect Effect (%)
By % People Bribing
in Education (Data) Benchmark Q ()1 
Less than 5% 0.633 2.37
5 to 10% 4.547 5.062
More than 10% 8.731 11.189
Notes: The benchmark specification for becoming competent is p (; Q()) =  + (1  ) Q ().
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence pertaining to the importance of educational
corruption. It develops a simple model whose key feature is a corruptible uni-
versity. Specifically, incompetent students can get a diploma if they pay a bribe.
The presence of incompetent graduates affects the quality of the pool of work-
ers and causes an adverse selection problem for firms. The induced misallo-
cation of talents forces production to fall. This is the direct effect of corrup-
tion. Because teachers are hired from the pool of graduates, corruption also
undermines the quality of the pool of teachers. Consequently, the creation of
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skills diminishes, fewer competent workers are available for production, and
the skilled wage premium increases. This is the indirect or feedback effect of
educational corruption. The feedback effect has dynamic long-term effects on
output.
Based on data on educational corruption, the public sector, and college en-
rollment and completion rates, the model is then calibrated. The benchmark
model is able to replicate qualitative and quantitative features of the data. It
also gives an idea of the impact of corruption on the quality of teachers. Hence,
the most corrupted countries (the countries with more than 10% of people pay-
ing a bribe in the education sector) have lower teacher quality-only 69% of the
quality of other countries.
Finally, counterfactual experiments are implemented. Specifically, each
channel of corruption is sequentially shut down, and its quantitative impor-
tance is assessed. The key result from these experiments is that the feed-
back channel is quantitatively more important than the direct channel. For
instance, the most corrupted countries in the sample could gain 9% in output
if the indirect channel was removed, representing roughly tenfold the gains re-
sulting from the removal of the direct channel. Moreover, removing corruption
in these countries would yield a 22% gain in output. These experiments high-
light the untold consequence of corruption: the potential impact of incompetent
teachers.
Many questions are still open for debate. For instance, which institutions
support prevalent levels of educational corruption? What policies can be im-
plemented to prevent educational corruption? What are the links with other
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troubling behaviour such as absenteeism? These challenging questions serve
as motivation for a better understanding of the institutionalization of educa-
tional corruption that is happening in many countries. Doing so will help de-
sign policies that enable countries to tackle corruption.
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Chapter 3
Civic Engagement, Social Capital
and Corruption
Corruption starts within the family unit and spreads in all levels of society.
-Precept #120, 1000 Pre´ceptes d’e´thique de civisme et de vie morale.1
3.1 Introduction
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon that affects all sectors and actors of
a country’s economy.2 Despite the large body of work on the subject, the in-
stitutions that support prevalent levels of corruption are not well understood.
In this respect, in many countries where there is a culture of corruption (i.e.,
where it has been accepted as a norm in the society), traditional policies based
1 Teaching manual on Civic and Moral Education (Be´nin). Translated from french by the
author. Source: http://www.moralisation.gouv.bj/ddl/Education Civique.pdf.
2 For theoretical analysis of corruption, see Becker and Stigler (1974), Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). Mauro (1995) provides empirical evidence of
the impact of corruption on output. Also, a report by the World Bank (2010) depicts the con-
cept of “quiet corruption” which indicates “various types of malpractice of frontline providers
(teachers, doctors, inspectors, and other government representatives)”.
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only on pecuniary incentives (e.g., audits and wage increases) may have only
limited results since they are likely not to change the bad habits enrooted in the
society.3 It is therefore important that economic models aiming to understand
corruption take society’s culture, norms, and social capital into consideration.
This chapter considers corruption as an endemic social phenomenon and
analyzes the role that civil society can play in reducing it. It is argued that
civic engagement can be effective at reducing corruption through the shaping
of citizens’ behaviour, and the monitoring of bureaucrats. Civic engagement in
the model is defined as the effectiveness with which a society catches/punishes
agents participating in corruption.4 Hence, a more engaged civil society is one
that is more effective at catching/punishing misbehaving agents. Theoretical
and empirical evidence-including evidence that causality goes from civic en-
gagement to corruption-are offered. The model expands on a simple corruption
framework with bureaucrats and citizens by allowing a role for civil society.5
The economy has an infinite horizon and agents live for one period. The role
of bureaucrats is to deliver (mandatory and identical) licenses to citizens, for
which they earn a salary.6 It is assumed that each bureaucrat delivers only
one license but has discretion over the speed of its delivery. Hence, bureaucrats
3 On policies targeting wages see Besley and McLaren (1993) and Di Tella and Schargrod-
sky (2003). Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) and Savedoff (2008) provide evidence of non-
statistical effects of wages on corruption. See also World Bank (2010) for a discussion of policies
against corruption.
4 The concept of civil society in this chapter should be understood as any organization able
to exert pressure on public servants and citizen. Also, the notion of civic engagement proposed
here differs from other definitions such as the participation in political activities (e.g. voting).
5 The corruption framework is similar to Becker and Stigler (1974).
6 One can think of driving licenses, or licenses to produce or sell goods or services. This ex-
ample of corruption aims to facilitate the discussion and examples of other forms of corruption
are also provided throughout the paper.
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can deliver licenses quickly in exchange of bribes. Citizens derive utility from
obtaining a licence quickly.7
Citizens can be one of two types, honest or opportunist. Honest citizens
commit not to participate in corruption, while opportunistic citizens partici-
pate in corruption if it is optimal to do so. This contrasts with bureaucrats
who are only opportunists. Hence, corruption occurs when bureaucrats accepts
(an endogenously determined) bribe from opportunistic citizens. When caught,
agents face sanctions that are proportional to the gains from corruption. In
this respect, the engagement of the civil society is modeled as its effectiveness
in catching/punishing misbehaving agents.
The evolution of honesty within the population is affected by both pecuniary
(e.g., wages and the probability of getting caught) and non-pecuniary benefits
(e.g., moral). It follows that civil society affects the monitoring of agents di-
rectly and the creation of social capital, captured through the notion of honesty,
indirectly.8
The evolutionary mechanism of types borrows from Francois and Zabojnik
(2005), which is discussed below. Although these authors do not study cor-
ruption, their formal approach to social capital can be applied to it. Citizens’
type is a trait that they acquire when young, influenced by their parents and
by the frequency of types in the economy. Specifically, the intergenerational
7 An implicit assumption is that all citizens, even when they are not participating in cor-
ruption, end up with licenses.
8 It should be acknowledged that the notion of social capital differs slightly from other pieces
(e.g., Putnam (1993) or Fukuyama (1995)) who define social capital as a set of informal values
or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one another.
However, it can be argued that the notion of honesty relates to trust and, therefore, relates in
a broad sense to this definition.
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transmission of preferences for citizens follows a stochastic socialization pro-
cess determined directly by parents (who maximize children’s expected welfare
based on their own preference type) and indirectly by the imitation of someone
outside of the family. The model embeds this process of preference evolution
into an environment where agents’ returns depend crucially on the actions of
profit maximizing bureaucrats. The evolution of honesty within the population
and, therefore, social capital, is in turn affected by bureaucrats’ decisions. This
interrelation between the society’s social capital and the actions of bureaucrats
is key to the institutionalization of corruption.
As in Francois and Zabojnik (2005), and to reflect the sociological treatment
of honesty as a personality disposition, the adjustment of the types of citizens
is modeled to be relatively slow to changes in the economy. This contrasts with
the decisions of bureaucrats who are assumed to react instantaneously to new
opportunities. The complementarity between the relatively quick-to-change
decisions of bureaucrats and the relatively slow-changing types of citizens cap-
tures the idea that social capital adjusts relatively slowly in comparison with
corporations (e.g., bureaucracy).
The framework is then utilized to run an experiment that consists of in-
creasing the involvement of civil society in the fight against corruption. Specif-
ically, misbehaving agents are more likely to get caught. It is established that
the whole economy converges to a steady state with fewer corrupted bureau-
crats and lower levels of corruption. However, the change in the number of
honest citizens is ambiguous, which stresses an important result: countries
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enjoy lower levels of corruption, not necessarily because they have more hon-
est citizens (i.e., more social capital), but rather because for each level of honest
citizens, lower levels of corruption are tolerated. This is similar to the idea of
an access to a better technology. Interestingly, increases in the bureaucrats’
wages are proven to be ineffective at reducing corruption in the proposed eco-
nomic environment.
Based on individual survey data from the Afrobarometer surveys (year 2005-
2006), the predictions of the model are confirmed empirically. The empirical
results also indicate that causality goes from civic engagement to corruption.9
The paper therefore complements the existing literature in several respects.
It provides explanations for why civic engagement can effectively fight corrup-
tion. It contributes to the literature by formally capturing and applying a dy-
namic notion of social capital to the issue of corruption. It also discusses formal
mechanisms under which civil society affects the latter. This novel approach
complements existing work on the role of social norms and nonpecuniary moti-
vations for corruption.
The definition of civil society varies considerably across conceptual paradigms
and country contexts. CIVICUS, an international association of civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs), defines civil society as:“the sphere of institutions, organi-
zations, and individuals located between the Family, the State and the Market,
in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests”. Putnam
(1993 and 2000) has a similar definition when he argues that civil society is
9 The limitations of the data - like the fact that it is not longitudinal - makes the causality
results only indicative.
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composed of groups, which crosscut ties of kinship and patronage. The con-
cept of civil society in this paper should be understood as any organization able
to exert pressure on public servants and citizens. Examples of such groups
include the media and NGOs fighting against corruption. Indeed, the media
contribute to the monitoring mechanism, and support the implementation of
anti-bribery instruments. For example, they can lead to the resignation of pub-
lic officials even in countries plagued with corruption.10
In addition, corruption is an important field of activity for NGOs and many
- like Transparency International - are involved in the monitoring of public
servants.11 The role of CSOs has received attention from institutions like the
World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). For instance, the OECD acknowledges that CSOs are crucial in its
anti-corruption and corporate governance initiatives.12 CSOs have also become
important partners for the World Bank, especially with respect to the delivery
and monitoring of social services and development programs. The World Bank
officially considers CSOs as a “complement to government action, especially in
regions where government presence is weak”.13 This perception vis-a-vis CSOs
is supported by recent studies demonstrating that projects are less affected by
corruption when CSOs participate in the design, monitoring, evaluation, and
10 Concrete examples of media’s achievements include the coverage of a financial scandal
that led to the resignation of a Minister of Education in Ghana in January 2012. Other ex-
amples include press articles about a fake University Professor in Co^te d’Ivoire that led to a
reevaluation of hiring procedures (Fraternite´ Matin, September 12-13th 2009 and Notre Voie,
September 30th 2009).
11 See Transparency International (2005).
12 See OECD (2003).
13 The citation is taken from http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0.
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management of public services.14 Finally, on a different but related subject,
the absence of an independent, non-partisan civil society can be linked to inef-
fective, or “de fac¸ade” democratic regimes, especially in Africa. Hence, CSOs’
engagement may contribute to the enforcement of good behaviour and practice
from public officials.
Of particular relevance for African countries, civil society can also take the
form of kin-based and ethnic organizations. These organizations can act as a
moral authority able to shape public opinions and monitor bureaucrats.15
This chapter relates to the literature on civil society which spans multiple
disciplines beyond economics, including sociology and political science. The role
of civil society in the literature is largely seen as beneficial. For example, civil
society is advantageous for the formation of trust: Putnam (1993) suggests that
Northern Italy’s economic progress over the country’s southern parts is mainly
explained by the dense networks of voluntary associations in the North. Sim-
ilarly, Fukuyama (1995) depicts how economic success depends on social insti-
tutions that can “generate extra-familial bonds of social trust”. In their review
of the literature, Anheier and Kendall (2000) provide other evidence-from the
economic, political science and sociological literature-of the link between the
notions of trust and civil society. Therefore, civic engagement may contribute
to long-term growth, if only through building trust.16
14 World Bank (2011) reports a speech of the President of the World Bank on the matter.
15 See Lewis (2001) for descriptions and examples of a broader view of civil society in Africa.
16 It is important to note that civil society might be ineffective due to the taming of NGOs
by government officials. Studying this key issue, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
For a discussion of the limitations of the positive effects of civil society, see Howell, Ishkanian,
Obadare, Seckinelgin, and Glasius (2006).
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The chapter also relates to recent reports and studies [e.g.,World Bank
(2010)] analyzing the quality of “frontline service providers” in developing coun-
tries. Finally, the paper is linked to the literature on evolutionary economics,
social norms, and culture like Platteau (2000). In particular, the evolution of
types borrows from Francois and Zabojnik (2005). They adapt the theoretical
framework of Bisin and Verdier (2001) and investigate the roles of society’s
norms, culture, or social capital in the process of economic development. In
their model, social capital is captured by the “trustworthiness” of agents and
affects the productive processes through contractual agreements. Specifically,
trustworthiness considerations determine the reliability of trading partners
and, therefore, the type of production that will be feasible. It follows that
social capital and modern production are complements, so that the evolution
of trustworthiness within the population is affected by firms’ production deci-
sions. This concept of social capital can be adapted to traditional corruption
framework, which allows exploring a “culturalist” perspective to the issue of
corruption.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 sets up the model determin-
ing steady states and dynamics; Section 3.3 provides an economic experiment
and derives the main results; Section 3.4 provides empirical background and
evidence in support of the model; and Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
The model captures in a simple and formal way, the interaction between bu-
reaucrats, citizens and civic engagement. It adapts the approach of social cap-
ital of Francois and Zabojnik (2005) to a corruption framework. To facilitate
the discussion, corruption takes the form of bribes for permits or licenses; how-
ever, the framework can capture other pervasive types of corruption such as
educational corruption, petty corruption or tax evasion.
The economy has an infinite horizon, and each period is denoted by a t sub-
script. In each period a unit measure of identical bureaucrats is born. Bureau-
crats live for one period and their roles is to deliver (mandatory and identical)
licenses, for which they earn a salary wB.17 It is assumed that each bureaucrat
can deliver only one license, but has discretion over the speed with which it is
delivered.18 A key feature of the model is that bureaucrats are corruptible, that
is, in exchange of a bribe they provide licenses quickly. As it will be discussed
in the next paragraph, this is valuable to some citizens. It is assumed that
bureaucrats care only about expected returns: their choice of whether to act
opportunistically (i.e., giving licences quickly) is determined by the conditions
of the economy. If bureaucrats participate in corruption, they get a bribe bt (on
top of their salary), but face a probability p(t) of being caught, where t 2 [0; 1]
17 For example, one can think of driving licenses, or licenses to produce or sell goods or
services.
18 Because this is not the key purpose of the model, I am not explicit about the exact process
through which bureaucrats deliver licenses. Again, this example aims to facilitate the discus-
sion and alternative examples could work too. For example, instead of bureaucrats, one could
think of policemen that can spend more or less time, or ask for more or less documents in their
controls. Another example is to think of nurses or doctor who decide of the order with which
they treat patients in an hospital.
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denotes the number of misbehaving bureaucrats. When caught, bureaucrats
are sanctioned financially and the sanction B is proportional to the gain of
corruption (i.e., B < 1).
In each period, a unit measure of citizens is also born; they live for one
period as well.19 Citizens are heterogenous with respect to their behaviour
regarding corruption. Some citizens, called opportunists are willing to bribe
bureaucrats in order to get licenses quickly, while other citizens, called “honest”
never participate in corruption. To obtain a licence quickly yields a gain ! in
utility metric.20 The citizens who participate in corruption pay the bribe bt and,
just like bureaucrats, face a probability p(t) of getting caught.21 When caught,
citizens are also sanctioned financially and the sanction C is proportional to
the gain of corruption (i.e., C < 1).
The probability of catching misbehaving agents (bureaucrats and citizens)
is linked to civic engagement: for a given level of misbehaving agents, a more
engaged civil society catches/punishes more of them. The probability that a
misbehaving agent is caught increases with the number of corrupted bureau-
crats and the increase occurs at a decreasing rate. Formally, it is assumed that
19 The equal measure of bureaucrats and citizens is not necessary here. Without loss of
generality, a larger population of citizens could be assumed.
20 One can interpret ! as the benefits from obtaining a licence quickly. In other examples
of corruption, ! could represent the gains from tax evasion, or, in the case of the buying of a
diploma, the expected gain from pretending to be competent on the labour market.
21 Imposing that misbehaving citizens face a different probability of being caught, for in-
stance one that does not depend on t, would not affect the results of the model.
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p0(t)  0, and p00(t)  0.22 In other words, for a given level of civic engage-
ment, misbehaving agents are caught with low probabilities when there are
only a few corrupted bureaucrats, but the probability of being caught increases
with the number of corrupted bureaucrats. It follows that the upper and lower
bounds for the probability are pu  p(1), and pl  p(0), respectively.
Finally, the size of the bribe is determined endogenously by the matching
that occurs between the misbehaving bureaucrats and the bribing citizens.
3.2.1 Preferences
As mentioned earlier, citizens are one of two types: honest or opportunist.
These features are intrinsic to the individual and are influenced by social con-
ditioning (described in the next section). The honest citizens commit to never
participate in corruption, that is, they are moral citizens who do not consider
participating in corruption. They receive a psychological, non-pecuniary, bene-
fit  when making good on their commitment.23;24 Such rewards find support in
the socio-psychological literature. For instance, Platteau (2000), Elster (1989)
22 It is possible to achieve similar results by imposing p0(t)  0. However, additional
assumptions are necessary. Indeed, with p0(t)  0 (and without additional assumptions),
an increase in the number of corrupted bureaucrats always leads to further increases of their
number, which is not desirable. Examples of additional hypothesis include allowing wB to be a
function of  and imposing restrictions on @wB@ < 0. Another alternative is to allow bureaucrats
to be heterogenous too and impose restrictions on their behaviour. With such hypotheses,
increases in the number of corrupted bureaucrats will not always lead to a further increase of
their number.
23 An implicit assumption is that, even when they are matched with corrupted bureaucrats,
honest citizens are still able to get a licence.
24 Alternatively, one could consider preferences that carry - in addition to  - a cost arising
from the reduced set of options that the honest type has available. Such a specification is
adopted by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Francois and Zabojnik (2005). Doing so would not
affect the qualitative results of this chapter.
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or Coleman (1990) examine such intrinsic motivations.25
An Honest Citizen living in period t has the following lifetime utility:
UHC (t) =
8><>: 0; if not matched with a corrupted bureaucrat;; otherwise:
The opportunistic citizens care only about their expected returns and, there-
fore, try to bribe for licenses if it is optimal to do so.26 In exchange for a bribe
bt, an opportunist obtains a license quickly from a corrupted bureaucrat, which
yields a gain in utility metric (!). The opportunists face a probability p(t) of
getting caught, in which case they lose a fraction C of !, with C < 1 . An
Opportunist’s lifetime utility at time t is thus
UOC (t) =
8><>: 0; if not able to find a corrupted bureaucrat;(1  p(t)) (!   bt) + p(t) (!   bt   C!) ; otherwise:
The bureaucrats are opportunists. They earn a wage wB and decide whether
to participate in corruption or not. When they do so, they receive the bribe bt
unless they get caught, in which case they get the bribe and only a fraction B
of the benefit !, with B < 1.27 Given the number of misbehaving bureaucrats
t, the lifetime utility of a bureaucrat is
UOB (t) =
8><>: wB; if not participating in corruption;(1  p(t)) (wB + bt) + p(t) (wB + bt   B!) ; otherwise:
25 Specifically, Platteau (2000) analyzes such psychological benefit under the heading of
“moral norms.”
26 Honest citizens are also optimizers though, just with different preferences.
27 Imposing that the sanction is proportional to the benefit of corruption !, guarantees lim-
ited liability. Alternatively, one could impose that the sanction is proportional to the wage wB
and/or that the bribe is lost, and get qualitatively similar results, except for one result in the
experiment section, for which I will be explicit.
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The matching process of bureaucrats and citizens can now be discussed.
3.2.2 The Matching Process and the Size of the Bribe
Bureaucrats are randomly matched with citizens and it is assumed that each
bureaucrat matches with at most one citizen. Let t and (1   t) respectively
denote the fractions of honest (H type) and opportunists (O type) citizens at
time t. Successful matchings, the ones generating corruption, depend on the
number of opportunists (1 t) and the number of misbehaving bureaucrats t.
It follows that:
Prob. (a corrupted bureaucrat meets an opportunistic citizen) = (1  t);
Prob. (opportunistic citizen meets a corrupted bureaucrat) = t:
Let VB (bt) and V OC (bt) respectively denote the value functions of bureaucrats
and citizens who participate in corruption when the size of the bribe at time t
is bt.
VB (bt) = Prob. Match  Value of a Match+ Prob. NoMatch  Value of NoMatch
= (1  t) [p(t)(wB + bt   B!) + (1  p(t))(wB + bt)] + twB
VB (bt) = wB + (1  t) [bt   p(t)B!] : (3.1)
and
V OC (bt) = Prob. Match  Value of a Match+ Prob. NoMatch  Value of NoMatch
= t [p(t)((1  C)!   bt) + (1  p(t))(!   bt)] + (1  t) 0
V OC (bt) = t [!(1  p(t)C)  bt] : (3.2)
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It follows that the participation constraints (P.C.) are
P.C. Bureaucrats: V OB (bt)  wB > 0 , (1  t) [bt   p(t)B!] > 0;
P.C. Opportunist Citizens: V OC (bt)  0 > 0 , t [!(1  p(t)C)  bt] > 0:
Using a simple Nash Bargaining solution, yields the optimal size of the bribe
bt :
bt =
!
2
[1  p(t)(C   B)] :
The optimal bribe thus splits the surplus that participants (bureaucrats and
citizens) receive, and also reflects the risk they face.
Using bt , the expected lifetime utility of citizens of either type at time t
becomes:
E

UHC (t)

= t;
and
E

UOC (t)

= t [!(1  p(t)C)  bt ]
=
t !
2
[1  p(t)(C + B)] :
In the same manner, the expected lifetime utility for bureaucrats is:
E

UOB (t)

= wB + (1  t) [bt   p(t)B!]
= wB +
(1  t)!
2
[1  p(t)(C + B)] :
3.2.3 Cultural Evolution of Preferences of Citizens
A citizen’s type is determined by an evolutionary process of cultural selection
inspired by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Francois and Zabojnik (2005), from
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which this section borrows. The principal feature of this approach is that the
evolution of type is influenced by the parents, who rely on their own preferences
to evaluate the lifetime returns of their child.
There is asexual one-for-one reproduction with the possibility of only two
types in the population-the honest and the opportunists. The intergenerational
transmission of preferences occurs through a stochastic socialization process.
There is a probability that parents socialize a child to have the same prefer-
ences as themselves; this is called direct socialization. There is also a probabil-
ity that an individual’s characteristics will be determined by imitating some-
one outside the family, a process called indirect socialization. The probability
that an honest parent directly socializes her child into being honest is denoted
dH(t; t). Similarly, let dO(t; t) denote the probability that an opportunistic
parent directly socializes her child into being opportunistic. Both probabilities
are allowed to be functions of the respective numbers of honest agents and cor-
rupted bureaucrats in the population. I will return to the precise relationship
subsequently.
If a child from a family with trait i = H or O is not directly socialized by her
parent, then she is indirectly socialized with a trait by imitating a randomly
chosen non-family member. This person may be a teacher, a more distant fam-
ily member, or anyone else with influence, but the upshot is that the probability
of a type simply reflects the frequency of that type in the population. For ex-
ample, given a parent of type H, if with probability 1 dH(t; t) the child is not
directly socialized by the parent, then with probability t the child is indirectly
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socialized to be H anyway (and, with probability 1-t, she is indirectly social-
ized to be O-type). Let P i;j be the probability that a citizen with a parent of type
i is socialized to trait j. It turns out that, by the law of large numbers, P i;j will
also denote the fraction of children with a type i parent who have preferences
of type j. The following equations describe these probabilities:
PH;H = dH(t; t) +

1  dH(t; t)

t (3.3)
PH;O =

1  dH(t; t)

(1  t)
PO;O = dO(t; t) +

1  dO(t; t)

(1  t)
PO;H =

1  dO(t; t)

t:
From these probabilities, it follows that the difference equation for  is
t+1   t = PH;H t + PO;H (1  t)  t
= t(1  t)

dH(t; t)  dO(t; t)

:
Using a continuous time limit of this equation produces:
dt = t(1  t)

dH(t; t)  dO(t; t)

: (3.4)
This differential equation describes how the socialization process deter-
mines the evolution of t in the population. From equation (3.4), it is clear that
the direction of evolutionary change depends critically on the relative proba-
bility dH(t; t)   dO(t; t). Intuitively, this states that evolutionary pressures
lead to an increase in type H if the probability of direct socialization by hon-
est parents exceeds the one of opportunistic parents, and vice versa. This also
formalizes the evolution of social capital (captured by honesty) in the economy.
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Direct Socialization and Relative Returns
Even though there is no explicit parental decision, direct socialization occurs as
if parents put efforts in socializing their children after themselves. This follows
Bisin and Verdier (2001).28 The parents, therefore, evaluate the expected life-
time utility of a person of their own type, and the better a person does relative
to those of the other type, the higher the probability of direct socialization. Be-
cause the evaluation is in terms of the parents’ own preferences, it can involve
more than just income.
A reduced-formmodelling approach is taken here. Hence, it is assumed that
dH(t; t) is increasing in E[UHC (t)]   E[UOC (t)] when evaluated using type H’s
preferences, and that dO(t; t) is increasing in E[UOC (t)] E[UHC (t)] when evalu-
ated using type O’s preferences. The reasoning here is spelled out in Bisin and
Verdier (2001): parents have what has been termed “partial empathy”, which
they use to determine how much effort they spend inculcating their child to be
the same type. When doing so, they consider the expected lifetime outcomes
that their child would obtain conditional upon the child’s realized type; the
empathic part. However, parents are able to evaluate these outcomes only by
using their own preferences; hence the partialness of the empathy. When they
estimate a large gain in expected outcome from inculcating the child to be like
themselves, they will expend great effort to make this so. These efforts involve
actions like instructing and monitoring the child in behaviour, disciplining, se-
lecting their contacts, and so forth. It is assumed that parents can exert some
28 It is possible to model explicitly the efforts of parents [as in Bisin, Topa, and Verdier
(2002)] and to obtain qualitatively similar results.
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influence over the outcome but that control is not perfect; hence the d’s remain
probabilities only. It is, moreover, assumed that parents are unable to inculcate
for a type that is not their own; a H-type parent simply does not have access to
the inculcation technology required to make an O-type offspring.
The difference in parental types’ evaluations of outcomes arises from the
nonpecuniary  term, which enters for the honest parents only. Thus, with t
corrupted bureaucrats, the evaluation from the perspective of honest parents
yields: dH(t; t) is increasing inE[UHC (t)] E[UOC (t)] = t

   !
2
[1  p(t)(C + B)]

.
Similarly, the evaluation from the perspective of opportunistic parents yields:
d0(t; t) is increasing in E[UOC (t)] E[UHC (t)] = t

!
2
[1  p(t)(C + B)]

, where
the only difference is that the  is not evaluated by these parents. It thus
follows directly that the difference in probability dH(t; t)   dO(t; t), is in-
creasing in the expression Z  t [   ! [1  p(t)(C + B)]].
Let : R![-1,1] define the mapping from Z to the probability difference
dH(t; t)   dO(t; t). Apart from 0 > 0, it is assumed that  is continuous
and that (0) = 0. The parametric restrictions that will be imposed below rule
out cases when one type clearly dominates so that the evolutionary dynamics
implied by (3.5) does not lead to only one type.
dt = t(1  t)

t [   ! [1  p(t)(C + B)]]

: (3.5)
Note that there is a “slow” adjustment implied by such an evolutionary spec-
ification. If direct parental socialization favours increased honesty (dH > dO)
then evolution will produce more honest individuals, but the population will
adjust only gradually and will not immediately consist entirely of H-types.
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3.2.4 Dynamic Adjustment of Bureaucrats
The law of motion for t is discussed next. From the lifetime utility of bu-
reaucrats, they participate in corruption if and only if the expected gains from
corruption are positive. Formally, they participate in corruption if and only if
(t; t)  (1 t)!2 [1  p(t)(C + B)] > 0.
The critical assumption here is that the measure of honest (and corrupted)
bureaucrats adjusts quickly relative to the speed at which citizens’ character-
istics change. It is assumed that all adjustment occurs immediately.29 In par-
ticular, define t 2 R such that (t; t ) = 0 so that d = 0. The law of motion
of corrupted bureaucrats can thus be described by the following equation. For
a given t
if (t ; t) < 0; then t > t and the measure of corrupted bureaucrats
decreases so that t = maxf0; tg;
if (t ; t) > 0; then t < t and the measure of corrupted bureaucrats
increases so that t = minf1; tg;
if (t ; t) = 0; then t = t and there is no change in t:
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(3.6)
Equation (3.6) ensures that t is a jump variable. It implies that the number
29 Intuitively, this assumption captures the idea that a corporation (here the bureaucracy)
adjusts more quickly than the society as a whole. This is analogous to firm adjustment being
quicker than that of individual types in Francois and Zabojnik (2005) and Nelson and Winter
(1982). Moreover, the model can be modified by allowing evolutionary considerations to affect
bureaucrats. For instance, one could obtain similar results by assuming that the bureaucrats
who commit not participate in corruption receive a psychological, non-pecuniary benefit when
making good on their commitment. However, it will still be required that they adjust more
quickly than citizens.
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of corrupted bureaucrats immediately adjusts to the environment. As demon-
strated in the appendix, (t; t) is downward sloping in the (; ) space: as the
number of honest citizens increases, the critical mass of corrupted bureaucrats
that can support corruption, , decreases.
Therefore, the evolution of the numbers of citizens and bureaucrats depends
on both pecuniary benefits (the probability of being caught and sanctions) and
non-pecuniary benefits (psychological benefit). Also, it should be noted that
civic engagement affects the monitoring of agents directly and the creation of
social capital (captured by the notion of honesty) indirectly.
3.2.5 Parameter Restrictions
Parameters restrictions are imposed to insure one type of agent does not always
dominate. Recall that pl  p(0), and pu  p(1) are the lower and upper bounds
on the probability a misbehaving agent gets caught.
Assumption 1.
   ! [1  pu(C + B)] > 0:
This assumption ensures that the net benefit of being honest is positive when
the probability of catching misbehaving bureaucrats is at its maximum. If this
was not the case, evolutionary forces would never favour the selection of the
honest type. However, in order to prevent that honesty is always prevalent the
following must also be imposed:
Assumption 2.
   ! 1  pl(C + B) < 0:
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Hence, when the probability of catching misbehaving bureaucrats is at its low-
est, selection cannot favour honest citizens. Conversely, the following assump-
tions insure that when the probability of being caught is low (high), there is an
incentive for bureaucrats to be dishonest (honest).
Assumption 3.
1  pl(C + B) > 0;
Assumption 4.
1  pu(C + B) < 0:
Therefore, assumptions 1 through 4 insure that citizens and bureaucrats’ be-
haviour are consistent with each other. Finally, restrictions on p() and its
derivatives are also imposed:
Assumption 5.
5.1 pu and pl are finite valued. In particular, p(0) < 1 and p(1) > 0:
5.2 8; p0(); and p00() are finite valued. Furthermore, 8;   p
00()
p0()
< 2:
Assumption 5 puts restrictions on the probability function and imposes that
the coefficient of relative risk aversion,   p00()
p0() , does not exceed 2; in other
words, agents are required not to be risk-lovers.
79
3.2.6 Steady States
The interaction between equations (3.5) and (3.6) determines the model’s steady
states. From (3.5), the term in large parentheses describes the expected re-
turns to honesty relative to opportunism, E[UHt ]  E[UOt ]:
t [   ! [1  p(t)(C + B)]] : (3.7)
The sign of (3.7) determines the direction of evolutionary changes, d, for
 6= 0 or 1. It can be shown that the first derivative with respect to t is
indeterminate: negative for low values of t and positive for high values of t.
Intuitively, when the number of corrupted bureaucrats is low, the proportion of
honest citizen is decreasing in t. For high levels of corrupted bureaucrats, the
fraction of honest citizens is increasing in t. It can also be shown that, given
the parameter restrictions and the properties of p0(t) and p00(t), the second
derivative of function (3.7) is always positive. It follows that function (3.7)
initially slopes downward, reaches a unique turning point, changes slope and
increases thereafter. This is depicted in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Evolutionary Incentives as a function of .
λλ
A
λt [γ − ω (1− p(λt)(δC + δB)) ]
The existence proposition for interior steady states can now be established.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1-5, there exists a unique stable interior
equilibrium, (A; A), if, and only if, there exists at least one value of  2 (0; 1)
such that  [   ! [1  p()(C + B)]] < 0.
In this equilibrium,
A(1  A)

A

   ! 1  p(A)(C + B)  = 0; (3.8)
and
(A; A) = 0; (3.9)
with (A; A))  (1 A)!
2

1  p(A)(C + B)

:
The formal proof of this Proposition is contained in Appendix E. The dynam-
ics of the model, however, can be understood diagrammatically (Figure 3.2).
At low and intermediary levels of , evolutionary incentives favour oppor-
tunism. Graphically, this is depicted by the benefit line in Figure 3.1 being
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Figure 3.2: Loci for d=0, and d=0.
λ
t
β
t
   
d λ =0
d β =0
below zero. However, as  increases, the probability of being caught also in-
creases. It follows that, for higher values of , evolutionary incentives favour
honesty. Because the benefits of citizens’ honesty are independent of , it fol-
lows that the movements are in the vertical  direction in the (; ) space, as
illustrated by the vertical arrows in figure 3.2. The d = 0 line corresponds
to the crossing point between the curved line and the horizontal axis in Fig-
ure 3.1.
The behaviour of bureaucrats, determined by equation (3.6), can also be an-
alyzed diagrammatically. The d = 0 loci correspond to the combinations of 
and  for which the bureaucrats are indifferent between participating in cor-
ruption or not; this happens when (; ) = 0. As mentioned above, because a
higher proportion of honest agents can only support lower levels of corruption,
this relationship is downward sloping in the (; ) space (as depicted in Figure
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3.2). The horizontal arrows illustrate the directional changes in .
Clearly, an interior steady state requires evolutionary incentives to be bal-
anced. This occurs where both d = 0 and d = 0. Assumptions 1 to 5 are
sufficient to ensure that the crossing points between the loci of d = 0 and
d = 0 are in the interior of the phase space. In figure 3.2, this condition occurs
at one value of .
At the stable steady state (A; A), any shock is offset by evolutionary forces,
illustrated by the arrows in 3.3, so that the equilibrium is maintained.
Figure 3.3: Interior Steady States.
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Hence, though by construction, opportunist agents always do better than
honest agents in a pecuniary sense, the (nonstandard) evolutionary dynamics
used here ensure the existence of an interior steady state with both types of
agents. It should be noted that an unstable steady state with no corruption
exists at one corner.
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Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1   5 there exists a steady state with only
honest citizens and no opportunistic bureaucrats ( = 1;  = 0). This steady
state is unstable. The corner with only opportunistic agents ( = 0;  = 1) is not
a steady state.
When there are no corrupted bureaucrats ( = 0), citizens can only be hon-
est ( = 1). However, this equilibrium is unstable since the evolutionary in-
centives favour opportunism for low values of . Hence, the economy cannot
stay in the good equilibrium without corruption. The other corner, with only
opportunistic agents is not an equilibrium, since the payoffs for being honest
move agents away from opportunism. The dynamics of the model are discussed
next.
3.2.7 Dynamics
Figure 3.4 depicts the dynamics of the system. Recall that the mass of cor-
rupted bureaucrats adjusts instantaneously, while the evolution of the types of
citizens is gradual. Hence, from any point not on the d = 0 loci, adjustment
involves immediate changes in  until the d = 0 loci is reached.
The interior steady state (A; A) is stable. At this point, a small increase in
 increases the psychological benefit of being honest and offsets its cost so that
evolutionary incentives favour honesty, and  rises. The increase in  leads, in
turn, to a decrease in , which eventually returns to A. The direction of any
adjustment away from a steady state is also depicted in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Convergence paths.
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3.3 Fighting Corruption Through an Engaged
Civil Society
The framework can now be used to inform the debate about the role of an
engaged civil society against corruption. The influence of Civil Society Orga-
nizations (CSOs) on public policies has increased in recent decades. Examples
of this include worldwide advocacy campaigns around issues including debt re-
lief, environmental protection, and the fight against hunger and poverty. Of
particular relevance to this paper, is the observance that civic engagement can
generate political will, can monitor and enforce good behaviour from public of-
ficials through multilateral actions that include regular interventions in the
media, and support for the implementation of anti-bribery instruments.
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In a field experiment conducted in India, Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2010)
showed that citizens can contribute to the monitoring of “frontline service providers”
like teachers. In their paper, students monitored their teacher’s attendance by
taking photographs with time and date stamps. The authors found that not
only did the absence rate of teachers fall by 21 percentage points relative to
the control group, but that children’s test scores increased by 0.17 standard
deviations. This experiment demonstrates that engaged citizens, empowered
with appropriate tools, can be effective at tackling the misbehaviour of public
officials.
Another example of the effective impact of changes in civic engagement is
found in Indonesia. During the Suharto’s regime, few institutions or people
denounced the systemic corruption that involved government officials and cor-
porate organizations. In the late nineties CSOs and the media began to expose
many cases of corruption, including scandals related to the Suharto ranches,
and to scams pertaining to the displacement of people for the construction of a
dam ; CSOs have also conducted research into the bribery of judges (Holloway
(2001)). All of these actions contributed to a decrease in corruption.
CSOs can shape the behaviour of economic actors through outreach activi-
ties. For example, a report of the OECD (2003) cited the role of civil society in
South East Europe. Until recently, civil society’s participation was perceived
as irrelevant for public policy. However, CSOs have increasingly been involved
in mobilizing against corruption and enhancing the institutional environment.
The USAID noticed a similar pattern in Benin in recent years, and reported
that CSOs’ awareness campaigns, and media coverage, forced public officials to
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denounce corruption perpetrated at all levels.30
Around the world, the increase in activity of civil society has led to enhanced
actions against corruption. A 2011 report from the World Bank discusses how,
for instance, in Mexico, CSOs contributed to the enactment of accountability
mechanisms, and how in South Africa, CSOs helped monitor the implementa-
tion of better financial regulations and service delivery.
These facts provide examples of how changes in the engagement of the civil
society can affect corruption outcomes. The experiment presented below adds
a formal basis to the discussion.
3.3.1 Modeling a more Engaged Civil Society
In this section, the effects of a more engaged civil society on the unique stable
equilibria are analyzed. Formally, this is captured by an exogenous change in
the model: the values of p() increase at all levels of . In words, opportunists
are more likely to get caught. Let pN() denote this new function.31 To ensure
existence of a stable steady state, pN needs to satisfy the parameter restrictions
contained assumptions 1 through 5.
A change in civic engagement has an effect on the equilibrium (A; A).
Substituting pN() for p() in the two differential equations governing the dy-
namics of the system (equations (3.8) and (3.9)), and solving for points at which
d = 0 and d = 0 yields a new equilibrium. Graphically, the increase in p(:)
30 The report, which collects specific descriptions of actions of civil society in Benin, is avail-
able at http://africastories.usaid.gov .
31 It should be clear that all parameters other than p(:) are unaffected.
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implies an upward shift in Figure 3.1. This shift implies a leftward shift in the
locus d = 0 at the stable steady state as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The effect on the differential equation of bureaucrats is also intuitive: for
each level of , a lower level of  is tolerated. Graphically, this is illustrated
by a downward shift of the loci d = 0 through the corner ( = 1;  = 0).
Figure 3.5 depicts the transition of the economy from the old to the new steady
state (A0; A0). In the new steady state, the number of corrupted bureaucrats
is unambiguously lower. However, the effect on  is ambiguous since it depends
on the effects on the loci d and d: if the effect on d is greater (smaller), 
increases (decreases).
As civil society becomes more engaged, there is an immediate decrease in
the number of corrupted bureaucrats, while the level of honest citizens is un-
changed; this is illustrated by a horizontal left arrow in both panels of Fig-
ure 3.5. In the case where the effect on d is bigger (top panel), the evolution-
ary forces lead to an increase in  such that the initial decline in  is followed
by subsequent decreases in . These decreases are the result of the increasing
difficulty of finding citizens willing to participate in bribery. The system finally
stabilizes at the new steady state (A0 ; A0). Therefore, under this scenario, the
change in civic engagement generates a virtuous circle whereby more social
capital emerges (more honest bureaucrats and citizens) and corruption falls.
In the scenario where the effect on d is smaller (bottom panel), the evo-
lutionary forces favour opportunism and the mass of citizens willing to bribe
increases. It follows that, after an initial decrease, the number of corrupted
bureaucrats increases. Indeed, the increased ease with which bureaucrats can
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Figure 3.5: Convergence paths: corruption falls.
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find citizens willing to bribe, and the increased size of bribes, attracts more bu-
reaucrats into being corrupted. The system finally stabilizes at the new steady
state (A0 ; A0).
Therefore, in the new equilibrium, the change in the number of honest
agents is ambiguous, while the number of corrupted bureaucrats falls unam-
biguously. Empowering civil society is thus effective in the fight against corrup-
tion, and the dynamics of adjustment, outlined here, provide a possible expla-
nation for why countries that developed engaged civil society have been able to
reduce corruption. Furthermore, the ambiguous effect on  stresses an impor-
tant result. Countries enjoy lower levels of corruption, not necessarily because
they have more honest citizens (i.e., more social capital), but rather because,
for each level of honest citizens, lower levels of corruption are tolerated. This is
similar to the idea of an access to a better technology.
It is interesting to contrast the effect of civic engagement with the fact that
wage policies are ineffective in this setup. Specifically, increasing the bureau-
crats’ wages wB would have no effects on the loci d and d, and would, there-
fore, be ineffective at reducing corruption.32 This prediction is consistent with
several empirical works that found no statistical significant relationship be-
tween wages and corruption.33
32 It should be acknowledged that this result depends on the specification of the sanction. If
the sanction on bureaucrats is made proportional to wages, wage policy can affect corruption
level. In addition, civic engagement tends to be higher in countries with higher levels of wages.
Hence, it cannot be ruled out that wage policies could play a role - even indirectly through civic
engagement - in the fight against corruption.
33 For example, using data from public hospitals in Argentina, Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2003) find no statistical relationship between pay and corruption - even after making adjust-
ments for hospital size, experience, and other factors. Savedoff (2008), in a note on the issue,
depicts similar patterns in Venezuela. For a list of papers on the relationships between wages
and corruption, see Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003).
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This section has demonstrated that civic engagement can play a role in the
fight against corruption by shaping citizens’ behaviour and monitoring bureau-
crats. The theory predicts three important results that can be tested empir-
ically. First, a negative relationship between civic engagement and corrup-
tion. Second, an ambiguous relationship between corruption and social capital.
Third an ineffective role for wage policies. The next section demonstrates that
these results (except result three due to a lack of data) are supported by the
data.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical support for the predictions of the model. The
data is taken from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer surveys, which were con-
ducted from March 2005 to February 2006. The Afrobarometer “measures the
social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa”, and is designed for cross-
country comparisons. The Afrobarometer is particularly suited for this paper
since it provides direct data on corruption, and variables that perform well as
proxies for the engagement of civil society. Round 3 of the Afrobarometer cov-
ers the following 18 countries: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Dropping all missing
observations on age and education leaves 25; 021 potential observations. The
section begins with a presentation of the variables that support the analysis,
followed by a discussion of the regression results.
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3.4.1 Empirical Definitions of Corruption, Social Capital
and Civic Engagement
A detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix G. Five indi-
cators of corruption contained in the survey are considered. These are: In the
past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a
favor to government officials in order to: (1) Get a document or a permit; (2)
Get a child into school; (3) Get a household service (like piped water, electricity,
or phone); (4) Get medicine or medical attention; and (5) Avoid a problem with
the police (passing a checkpoint, avoid a fine or arrest). Specifically, dummy
variables indicating whether individuals paid bribes A Few Times or Often are
constructed.34
Social capital in the model relates to the trait of character (a preference
parameter) determining whether individuals would participate in corruption.
To capture this notion empirically, a dummy variable is constructed to indicate
whether an individual would bribe in any of the following situations :35
 if encountering a misbehaving school or clinic official;
 if his/her name is off the voters roll;
 if encountering delays to get a government permit or license;
 in the event of a wrongful arrest in his/her family;
34 The possible answers to the questions are Never, Once or Twice, A Few Times and Often.
It should be noted that relying on ordered probit to analyze the corruption levels yields results
that are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here.
35 Alternatively, one could rely on each individual indicator and obtain similar results.
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 in the event of a wrongly seized family land.
Finally, the notion of civic engagement is analyzed through an indicator
that is constructed at the country level. The indicator is the propensity that
citizens have (or would have) joined others to raise an issue several times or
often.36
The aforementioned measures of corruption and social capital are sequen-
tially regressed on the proxy of civic engagement. Doing so allows us to inves-
tigate the effect of civic engagement, at the country level, on the individual’s
decision to participate in corruption, and the individual’s level of social capital.
Besides civic engagement, the regressions of corruption include other con-
trols such as the respondent’s gender, age (and age2), education level dummies
(primary or postsecondary), and employment status.37 Because corruption is
likely to be more common in cities, the specification controls for whether the
respondent lives in an urban district. To account for institutional differences
attributable to colonization, a dummy for former British colonies is introduced.
A dummy variable for West African countries is also included, which is meant
to capture potential unobserved cross-country regional features. Finally, a re-
spondent’s social capital dummy is also included to align with the model.38
The specification that has social capital as the dependent variable controls
for gender, age, age2, the urban district dummy, and civic engagement. These
variables tell something about variation across individuals. To align with the
36 Possible answers are No, would never do this; No, but would do if had the chance; Yes, once
or twice; Yes, several times and Yes, often.
37 The education category that is left out is secondary education.
38 Removing the social capital indicator from the corruption regressions yields similar result.
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model, the specification also controls for the country-average social capital. To
perfectly align with the model, one would include the social capital of parents,
however this variable is unavailable.
All specifications correct for heteroscedasticity, and the residuals are clus-
tered at the district level. This formulation intends to capture the possibility
that formal institutions vary within a country, possibly at the district level.39
3.4.2 OLS Results
The predictions from the model are compared with empirical results herein
contained. Specifically, I expect (1) a negative relationship between civic en-
gagement and corruption, and (2) an ambiguous relationship between corrup-
tion and social capital.40
Table 3.1 reports the empirical finding with respect to the relationships be-
tween corruption and civic engagement. A seemingly counterintuitive result is
the positive estimate associated with civic engagement when using OLS (odd
columns in Table 3.1). However, this estimate can be interpreted as a correla-
tion resulting from the endogeneity of civic engagement: corruption might well
be the reason why citizens join others to raise an issue (the empirical definition
of civic engagement). Indeed, ceteris paribus, citizens are more likely to feel
39 It should be noted that the results are qualitatively robust to the introduction of output
per capita as measured by the real chain-weighted series RGDPCH, year 2005, of the P.W.T.
6.3 Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
40 The prediction pertaining to the ineffectiveness of wage policy has not been tested due to
the lack of data. For example, the wage database of Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) contains
little information on the countries of the Afrobarometer database: beyond the year 2000, it
only provides wage observations for Madagascar and Malawi.
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concerned with, and be engaged against corruption when their country is plagued
with issues affecting public life like corruption.41 It follows that the OLS re-
gressions from Table 3.1 might just capture this mechanism. Thus, in order
to identify a causal impact of civic engagement on corruption, an instrumental
variable approach (discussed in the next subsection) will be implemented.
Table 3.2 reports the relationships between social capital and civic engage-
ment. It is found by OLS (first column) that civic engagement has no significant
effect on social capital. This empirical result is consistent with the prediction
of the model, which showed that higher levels of civic engagement lead to pos-
itive, negative or no changes in social capital. However, just like in the case of
corruption, civic engagement is likely to be endogenous to social capital, which
also requires an analysis of causal relationships.
3.4.3 Instrumental Variables
Civic engagement is likely to be endogenous with respect to corruption and
social capital. It is therefore important to test the robustness of the (OLS)
results contained in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and to assess causal relationships, for
instance, with instrumental variable techniques.42
Two country-level variables are used as excluded instruments for civic en-
gagement. The first is the percentage of respondents who frequently use media;
41 This can be linked to the assumption p0() > 0 of the model: ceteris paribus when the level
of corruption increases, civil society is more likely to focus on it and corrupted bureaucrats are
more likely to be punished.
42 As another robustness test (not shown here), a fully joint system of corruption and social
capital is also estimated. The simultaneous equations system is estimated by three-stage least
squares and yields similar results.
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Table 3.2: Social Capital and Civic Engagement
Dependent variables:
Social Capital Measure: Would Bribe
OLS IV
Female -0.021 -0.021
(0.005) (0.005)
Age -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Age2 0.015 0.016
(0.009) (0.009)
Urban 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.007)
Would Bribe 0.010 0.010
(Country Average) (0.000) (0.000)
Join Others to 0.0001 0.0002
Raise Issues (0.0004) (0.001)
N Obs. 22,350 22,350
Root MSE 0.33 0.23
KP Wald F-1st 55.64
Hansen’s J (p-value) 0.020 (0.89)
Significance levels :  = 10%  = 5%    = 1%
Notes: In the estimating equations, the unit of observation is the individual. A constant was in-
cluded in all regressions. The standard errors (in parentheses) correct for heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at the district level. Coefficients and standard errors associated with Age2 are mul-
tiplied by 1000. The variable Would Bribe captures the propensity to bribe in various situations
(see the text for details). Endogenous variable in IV analysis is the country-level measure of civic
engagement (Join Others to Raise Issues) estimated using Ivreg2 in STATA 11.1. KP Wald F-1st
is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of the first stage of the IV analysis. The Root MSE is
the standard error of the regression. A description of each variable is offered in the appendix.
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the second is the percentage of respondents who very strongly agree that women
should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men. To be
valid, instruments are required to (a) be correlated with civic engagement, and
(b) not influence the participation in corruption directly (the exclusion restric-
tion).
The frequent use of media is associated with civic knowledge, which intu-
itively relates to civic engagement.43 Similarly, the role of women in the society
has been historically associated with civil rights and the emergence of civic en-
gagement. Therefore, these instruments are thought to be correlated with civic
engagement. Furthermore, theoretically, there is no reason why any of these
instruments should directly affect the participation to corruption.
As in Lassen (2007), I evaluate the validity of a) by considering the F-
statistic from the first stage regression, while the validity of the exclusion
restriction is investigated indirectly with an overidentification test (Hansen
test).44 Specifically, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic of the first stage re-
gression captures the ability of the instruments to explain the variations in
civic engagement. For the Hansen’s J statistics, the null hypothesis is that the
43 For instance, Dee (2004) defines the quality of civic knowledge as the frequency of news-
paper readership. For this chapter, it should be noted that, similar results as the ones depicted
here were obtained using the knowledge of the constitutionality, or the knowledge of the pres-
idential term instead of the use of media. The major drawback of these variables is that they
were not asked in Zimbabwe.
44 Because the number of instruments is greater than the number of endogenous variables,
the instrumenting equation is overidentified. The Hansen test, a test of whether the overiden-
tifying restrictions are valid, provides some insight, but no definitive answer, into the appro-
priateness of maintaining the exclusion restriction.
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specification is not overidentified, hence a high p-value confirms that the overi-
dentifying restrictions are not violated, which suggest that the exclusion re-
striction is valid. The two bottom rows of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report information
on instrument validity. Together, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F, the Hansen’s J
statistics suggest that the proposed instruments are valid.
Interestingly, when the endogeneity with respect to corruption of civic en-
gagement is accounted for (Table 3.1), civic engagement has the expected sign.
Importantly, its significant effect is consistent and robust to all definitions of
corruption. In other words, in countries where civic engagement is high, in-
dividuals have a lower probability to participate in corruption. Furthermore,
though the effects are similar across measures of corruption, they tend to be
higher for bribes related to obtaining medical attention, bribes that avoid con-
frontations with the police, and bribes that help acquiring household services.
Similarly, the IV estimates confirm that civic engagement has no significant
effect on social capital, which is consistent with the prediction of the model.
Therefore, the predictions from the model are consistent with the empirical
evidence contained herein.
3.4.4 Limitations
Although the F-test statistics, the stable mean squared error, and the Hansen’s
J statistics confirm the validity of the instruments, the results should be taken
with caution. Indeed, the observations are available only for a single year,
which puts restrictions on an analysis of the full dynamic interactions between
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civil society, social capital, and corruption. With a sufficiently long time se-
ries, one could, for instance, analyze how changes in corruption are affected by
changes in civic engagement. Also, as mentioned earlier, the effect of wages
has not been tested empirically. Finally, the estimation of endogenous social
effects like civic engagement is generally difficult.45 A refinement of the data,
which would allow for a better link between civic engagement, corruption, and
social capital is therefore required to definitively address these issues.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the empirical results indicate that
the predictions of the model consistent with the data. Throughout, I find that
civic engagement reduces the level of corruption but does not significantly af-
fect social capital. These results are robust to correcting for the endogeneity of
civic engagement.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter sheds light on the institutions that support high levels of corrup-
tion. It considers the latter as a social endemic phenomenon and analyzes the
role that civil society can play in reducing it. Both empirical and theoretical
evidence have been presented.
The theoretical model expands on a simple corruption framework with bu-
reaucrats and citizens. Citizens can be honest (i.e., commit not to participate
in corruption) or opportunist (i.e., participate in corruption if it is optimal to
45 For a discussion of issues pertaining to the estimation of social effects, see Manski (1993).
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do so) while bureaucrats are opportunists. The engagement of the civil soci-
ety is modeled as its effectiveness in catching/punishing misbehaving agents.
The model is dynamic and the evolution of honesty within the population is
affected by both pecuniary (e.g., wages or the probability of getting caught)
and non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., morality). It follows that civil society affects
the monitoring of agents directly and the creation of social capital-captured
through the aforementioned notion of honesty-indirectly. The mechanism that
drives the evolution of types is borrowed from Francois and Zabojnik (2005),
whose formal approach to social capital is applied to corruption. The adjust-
ment of citizens’ types is modeled to be relatively slow to changes in the eco-
nomic environment; this feature reflects the sociological treatment of honesty
as a personality disposition. Conversely, bureaucrats are allowed to adjust to
new opportunities instantaneously.
It is found that a greater involvement of civil society can effectively reduce
the level of corruption. In particular, when civic engagement increases, the
whole economy converges to a steady state with fewer corrupted bureaucrats
and lower levels of corruption. However, the change in the mass of honest
agents is ambiguous, which stresses an important result: countries, therefore,
enjoy lower levels of corruption not necessarily because they have more social
capital, but rather because lower levels of corruption are tolerated for each
level of honest citizens. Interestingly, wage policies are proven to be ineffective
in this economic environment.
Despite limitations, the analysis of the Afrobarometer survey data suggests
101
that the predictions of the model are supported by the data. The results in-
dicate that higher levels of civic engagement are associated with lower levels
of corruption, but do not have any statistical significant effect on social cap-
ital. The results are robust for several specifications, including five different
definitions of corruption, as well as for controlling for the endogeneity of civic
engagement by using an instrumental variable approach. In addition, the re-
sults suggest that the causality goes from civic engagement to corruption.
The paper therefore contributes to the literature by formally capturing and
applying a dynamic notion of social capital to the issue of corruption. This
novel approach complements existing work on the role of social norms and non-
pecuniary motivations for corruption.
The chapter analyzed the role of civil society has being largely beneficial.
However, the emergence of a civil society that satisfies this feature is chal-
lenging. Indeed, civil society organizations (CSOs) need to be sufficiently em-
powered to undertake an active role for the participation of citizens and the
monitoring of government. In order to succeed, CSOs in developing countries
need technical and financial capacities that are often lacking. Furthermore,
CSOs do not necessarily agree on issues: constituencies may have conflicting
interests, especially in poor societies [Rajan (2009)]; it can also be the case that
CSOs are financed by corrupted officials so that they become ineffective.46
Finally, the effectiveness of civil society in reducing corruption is an empir-
ical question. For instance, the intergenerational/dynamic aspect of the effects
46 See Lewis (2001) for a discussion of the adaptation of the concept of civil society in Africa.
102
of civic engagement on corruption deserves more attention if one wants to in-
vestigate the socialization process. Also, the effects of civic engagement should
be compared to other practices used against corruption. For example, using
data from Indonesia, Olken (2007) showed that grassroots community was less
effective at reducing corruption than traditional top-down monitoring (e.g., au-
dits). It is, therefore, crucial for future research to find out which methods work
best and determine the best practices against corruption. This would inform
both policy makers and CSOs that are engaged in the fight against corruption.
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Chapter 4
An Empirical Investigation of
Ethnicity and Trust in Africa
Well-considered, carefully planned initiatives (. . . ) that bring communities together,
foster dialogue, and achieve long-term reconciliation could allow Africans to rise
above competitive, and often petty, politics at the level of micro-nations (i.e., ethnic
groups) and address the pressing larger issues confronting the nation-state.
-Wangari Maathai, The Challenge for Africa.1
4.1 Introduction
Ethnic fragmentation has received considerable attention in economic litera-
ture, which has shown that ethnic fragmentation is associated with negative
outcomes in the efficient provision of public goods, the accumulation of human
capital, and growth.2 Despite a plethora of hypotheses, why, where, and when
1 Wangari Maathai is the Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 2004.
2 See Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) for evidence in the United States, Gradstein and
Justman (2000) for a theoretical implication on human capital, and La Porta, Lopez de Silanez,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) for cross-country evidence.
108
ethnic origin is relevant to individuals and economic activities is largely un-
clear. This chapter intends to shed light on this matter.
The main idea of the chapter is to study the relevance of ethnicity through a
particular facette: the links between ethnic origin and trust. The connections
between one’s trust in one’s own ethnic group (intra-ethnic trust) and one’s
trust in other ethnic groups (inter-ethnic trust) are examined. Hence, if ethnic-
ity is irrelevant, individuals should trust the members of other ethnic groups
just as much as they trust the members of their own group. However, if ethnic
origin matters for individuals, they should exhibit a gap between their levels
of intra- and inter-ethnic trust. If these differences in trust exist, they could
potentially add inefficiencies similar to the ones depicted in the literature on
trust and which can be summarized by this quote: “When people trust each
other, transaction costs in economic activities are reduced, large organizations
function better, governments are more efficient.”3
The chapter focuses on Africa since it is a continent with vivid ethnic ten-
sions in some countries and none in many others. Nevertheless, most conclu-
sions can also apply to other geographic regions. The determinants of inter-
ethnic trust are examined using data provided by Round 3 of the Afrobarom-
eter. It is first shown that, though a majority of individuals have identical
levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, a non-negligible fraction of them exhibit
differences. This result suggests that ethnic origin matters for trust.
For each level of intra-ethnic trust, a multivariate analysis is implemented
3 Quoted from Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
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to uncover the individual and socio-economic determinants that are signifi-
cantly associated with inter-ethnic trust. This procedure makes it possible to
determine whether or not variables are consistently (i.e., across levels of intra-
ethnic trust) associated with inter-ethic trust levels. For instance, it is found
that individuals tend to exhibit higher levels of inter-ethnic trust with age.
Gender and religious beliefs are weakly correlated with inter-ethnic trust, and
education is ambiguously and inconsistently associated with inter-ethnic trust.
Unsurprisingly, individuals who belong to an ethnic group that feels that’s it’s
treated unfairly by the government tend to attach lower levels of trust towards
other ethnic group.
It is also shown that living in a country with more homogenous ethnic
groups increases inter-ethnic trust, while ethnic diversity at the district level
is insignificant. These results suggest that ethnic diversity undermines the
formation of trust; this is consistent both with the idea that conflicts are be-
ing more likely to occur in multi-ethnic countries and with the literature that
predicts lower levels of trust among heterogeneous communities. The contrast
between national and district ethnic diversity could be explained by endoge-
nous sorting: individuals who trust other ethnic groups more are more likely
to live with other ethnic groups. The implications of such a sorting are consis-
tent with conflicts potentially occurring in multi-ethnic countries where whole
districts (or neighbourhoods) are homogenous even though little trust exists
across communities.
Another result pertaining to district characteristics is that living in a dis-
trict with socio-economic infrastructures (e.g., a market) is associated with
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higher levels of inter-ethnic trust. The importance of district level character-
istics suggests that the availability of socio-economic infrastructures increases
inter-ethnic trust or, alternatively, that areas with more inter-ethnic trust lead
to more of such infrastructures.
The study then draws a link between economic growth and inter-ethnic
trust. It is determined that growth levels over long periods (15 and 25 years)
are strongly associated with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust. However, the
association between recent growth (5 years) and inter-ethnic trust is insignifi-
cant. In other words, sustained growth over long periods of time is correlated
with inter-ethnic relationships. On one hand, this result is consistent with re-
cessions undermining the formation of inter-ethnic trust. On the other hand,
the result might capture the endogeneity of growth with respect to inter-ethnic
trust: countries with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust should, ceteris paribus,
experience higher levels of economic growth. Unfortunately, the direction of
causality cannot be determined with the data at hand.
Interestingly, key variables have different correlations (signs or significance)
with inter- or intra-ethnic trust. These differences stress the importance of
analyzing inter-ethnic trust in relation to intra-ethnic trust instead of gen-
eral trust only. For example, with respect to inter-ethnic trust, living in an
urban district becomes insignificant when controlling for ethnic composition
and socio-economic infrastructures. This suggests that ethnic composition and
socio-economic infrastructures “explain” the role of the variable urban for inter-
ethnic trust. However, the variable urban is negatively associated with intra-
ethnic trust, and remains significant when controlling for ethnic composition
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and socio-economic infrastructures. This suggests that city-specific features
(other than ethnic composition and the socio-economic infrastructures) matter
for intra-ethnic trust. This result highlights the importance of cities in the for-
mation of trust in African countries: cities not only provide opportunities for
interaction between members of different ethnic groups, but they also deeply
affect intra-ethnic interactions.
Growth is another important variable that offers a contrast. Indeed, the
results of the chapter suggest that inter-ethnic trust is procyclical, while intra-
ethnic trust is countercyclical. One interpretation of this is that long reces-
sions undermine social cohesion since they increase the gap between intra-
and inter-ethnic trust. This view might explain why, despite decades of sta-
bility without particular ethnic tensions, ethno-political crises erupted in some
African countries (e.g., Coˆte d’Ivoire or Kenya) during long and deep economic
recessions. Another interpretation simply suggests that countries with bigger
gaps between intra- and inter-ethnic trust (and thus, implicitly, lower social
cohesion) tend to have lower growth rates.
The chapter makes important methodological contributions. First, it looks
at the two sides of ethnic relationships: relations with one’s own ethnic group
and relations with other ethnic groups. This departs from other papers on
the subject [e.g., Bannon et al. (2004), and Eifert et al. (2010)], which focus
only on an individual’s ethnic identity without analyzing the key relationship
with other ethnic groups. Second, the chapter provides multi-layer evidence of
factors at the individual, ethnic, district, and country levels, which consistently
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contribute to higher levels of inter-ethnic trust across different levels of intra-
ethnic trust.
As foreseen earlier, the results pertaining to district characteristics, eth-
nic diversity, and growth do not address causality. Unfortunately, the data
does not allow me to determine the direction of causality, so their coefficients
can have different interpretations. Nevertheless, these results are still inter-
esting to analyze since so little is known about inter- and intra-ethnic trust.
Furthermore, regardless of the direction of causality, the results presented in
the study are consistent with the idea of self-reinforcing mechanisms between
socio-economic infrastructures, growth, and ethnic relations.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the main hypothe-
ses that guide the empirical work. Section 4.3 presents the data. Sections
4.4 and 4.5 display the regression results pertaining to intra- and inter-ethnic
trust, respectively. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Ethnicity and Trust-Why Should We Care?
Ethnic relations are examined through the lenses of trust. The interest is in
determining whether individuals trust their own and other ethnic groups dif-
ferently. This is one, and certainly not the only, expression of ethnicity that
presents the advantage of available data. This section provides evidence for
the relevance of the question for economists, and it lays out the major hypothe-
ses that will be investigated in the empirical section.
113
This chapter aims to understand the factors that are associated with inter-
and intra-ethnic trust. Ethnicity, specifically ethnic fragmentation, has re-
ceived attention from economists. A large empirical literature demonstrates
the negative impact of ethnic fragmentation, especially for developing coun-
tries. Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), for ex-
ample, showed that ethnic fragmentation has a negative effect on the efficiency
of the provision of public goods. Mauro (1995) established a negative link be-
tween ethnic fragmentation and corruption. Gradstein and Justman (2000)
developed a model where social/ethnic fragmentation diminishes incentives for
investment in human capital through a less efficient public provision of ed-
ucation. With U.S. data, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) found that the
provision of public goods is more efficient in districts that are racially homoge-
neous.
With respect to the issue of trust, experimental and empirical evidence has
established that the level of trust and the degree of trustworthiness decrease
with ethnic diversity. For example, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Sout-
ter (2000) found that trustworthiness declines when partners are of different
races or nationalities; Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found that the individ-
uals who live in racially heterogeneous localities exhibit lower levels of trust.
Another paper linking trust to ethnic diversity is Lassen (2007) who, using
cross-country evidence, found that the size of the informal sector increases in
the degree of ethnic fragmentation. His mechanism is that ethnic fragmenta-
tion (i) leads to a decrease of the level of trust, which decreases tax compliance
and (ii) increases the unwillingness to contribute to financing public goods to
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the extent that these (primarily) benefit other ethnic groups. Recently, Rohner,
Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2011) found that cross-community distrust about peace-
ful trade could lead to civil conflicts, war, and further collapse of trust and social
capital. In another paper, the same authors found evidence of the negative ef-
fect of civil conflict on social capital using survey data from Uganda (Rohner,
Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2012). Moreover, they established the causal effects of
outbursts of ethnic conflicts on trust and ethnic identity.
Using aggregate data, Easterly and Levine (1997) showed that ethnic frag-
mentation has a negative impact on growth. Chang and Kerr (2009) provided
empirical evidence that ethnic insiders, defined as individuals of the same eth-
nic origin as the president, are more likely to turn a blind eye to corruption.
Furthermore, and regarding the political economy of Africa, the home regions
of public officials have often benefited from access to basic commodities, infras-
tructures, and megalomaniac monuments and palaces (at the expense of the
State). Nepotism on an ethnic basis is also a norm for access to various favours
such as jobs. There is, therefore, evidence that ethnicity plays a significant role
in social capital and the political economy of nations and regions.
Unfortunately, the literature is unclear about the reasons why ethnicity is
relevant in some countries and not others. This question also stands within
countries: Why is ethnicity an issue in some regions/cities and not in others?
The “endogeneity” of ethnic relations, therefore, raises important questions re-
garding economic development and public policies. Wangari Maathai, the No-
bel Peace Prize laureate of 2004, stresses the importance of understanding eth-
nic relations. In her book, The Challenge for Africa, two chapters discuss the
115
issue of ethnicity and call for a better understanding of the complex relations
that exist between ethnic groups as well as ethnic groups and the nation-state.
An important dimension that has also been omitted in the economic litera-
ture is the dynamic evolution of the relations between races or ethnic groups.
For instance, until recently, several Western democracies denied voting rights
to some groups and even banned interracial marriages. Closer to the African
context and to this chapter, many ethno-political crises emerged in countries
that seemed free of ethnic clashes for a long period of time. Such crises deserve
more attention from economists.4
To understand the relevance of ethnicity to individuals, the chapter exam-
ines an observable variable that captures traits of ethnic relations: the gap
that may exist between the trust in one’s own ethnic group (intra-ethnic trust)
and the trust in other ethnic groups (inter-ethnic trust). If individuals have
the same levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, the gap is low, and ethnicity is
likely not to be relevant.5
4 In Section 4.4, it will be shown that an important determinant of these evolutions is likely
to be long-term growth: economic recessions may induce ethnic tensions over control of smaller
“shares of the pie”.
5 The economics literature on trust is rich and essentially exhibits its role for the transac-
tion costs. Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995), for instance, showed that trust is associated
with greater cooperation and efficiency of “large” organizations such as firms, cities or states.
Furthermore, La Porta, Lopez de Silanez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) illustrated the positive
significant effect of trust on the performance of government. The authors found that the ef-
fect is essentially realized through enhanced judicial efficiency, anti-corruption measures or
bureaucratic quality.
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4.2.1 Hypotheses
Before showing empirical results, this subsection reviews possible channels of
what might determine levels of inter- and intra-ethnic trust. The variables
are classified into four categories: an individual’s characteristics, ethnic group
characteristics, the characteristics of the district in which the individual lives,
and growth.
First, both types of ethnic trust can be influenced by an individual’s (e.g.,
age, religion, and gender). It can also be expected that education plays a role
since it may instill civic values or expose individuals to more heterogenous
people. Living in a city, recent traumatic experiences and stress might also
affect ethnic trust levels.
Second, inter- and intra-ethnic trust may be associated with ethnic group
characteristics. In particular, if an ethnic group perceives(correctly or incor-
rectly) that it is discriminated against by the government, its members might
trust people from other groups relatively less. This behaviour towards trust
would be a manifestation of an introverted assertion of one’s identity. Exam-
ples of this include perceptions of economic and political discrimination, and
the feeling of being treated unfairly by the government. The relative size of the
ethnic group (at the district and country levels) may also matter in shaping
individuals’ ethnic trusts levels.6
6 It should be noted that other causes, such as the legacy of wars or other conflicts be-
tween groups, could also affect inter-ethnic trust, especially specific trust between one ethnic
group and another (“one-to-one” inter-ethnic trust). Unfortunately, the data that will support
the analysis does not allow me to investigate such “one-to-one” inter-ethnic trust. Indeed, it
captures trust in other ethnic group as a whole, rather than trust in each other ethnic group
individually.
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Third, the district in which the individual lives may be associated with her
inter- and intra-ethnic trust levels. Indeed, district characteristics determine
the environment in which individuals from different groups interact. For in-
stance, we can expect higher inter-ethnic trust in districts with facilities that
foster social interactions (e.g., recreational or sport areas) or with any other
facilities where individuals get together (e.g., markets). We can also expect
that the heterogeneity of the district (or country) plays a role in shaping ethnic
relations.
Finally, economic growth may also affect ethnic trusts levels. Economic re-
cessions may lead to lower levels of inter-ethnic trust, especially if citizens feel
like the fair “share of the pie” of their group is threatened. The district and
country’s factors, therefore, stress the importance of harmonious social inter-
actions in the building of inter-ethnic trust.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis relies on data from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer sur-
veys. These surveys, which “measure the social, political, and economic at-
mosphere in Africa,” are particularly well-suited for the purpose of the study
as they include questions on trust and ethnicity, and they are designed for
cross-country comparisons. Round 3 of the Afrobarometer was conducted from
March 2005 to February 2006 and covered the following 18 countries: Benin,
Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
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Zambia, and Zimbabwe.7 Figure 4.1 presents the countries of the survey. Cape
Verde Islands and Zimbabwe were dropped because the ethnicity of respon-
dents was not recorded for these countries. This, along with other restrictions
imposed during the cleaning of the data, leaves out 20; 926 potential observa-
tions.8
This chapter focuses on the trust individuals attach to their own ethnic
group and to other ethnic groups. The answers to the following Afrobarometer
questions were collected:
1. How much do you trust people from your own ethnic group?
2. How much do you trust people from other ethnic groups?
The answers to these questions gauge intra- and inter-ethnic trust levels, re-
spectively. The categories for both questions are Not at All (0), Just a Little (1),
Somewhat (2) and A Lot (3).
The levels of intra-ethnic trust are reported in the first column of Tables H.1
in Appendix J. They tend to be low since only 56% of the whole sample have
Some or A lot of trust in members of their own ethnic group. However, the level
varies across countries: it is as low as 40% in Botswana and Nigeria and 52%
in South Africa, and as high as 75% in Mali and 82% in Senegal.
7 The Afrobarometer dataset has already been used by researchers interested in trust
Lavalle´e, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud (2008); Nunn and Wantchekon (2008) and/or politi-
cal sciences.
8 Observations with missing data on age, education and intra- and inter-ethnic trust ques-
tions were removed, and only ethnic groups with at least 10 members were kept.
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Figure 4.1: Round 3 countries. Source: Nunn and Wantchekon (2008)
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4.3.1 Do Individuals TrustMembers of Other Ethnic Groups
the Same as Members of Their Own Ethnic Group?
The analysis starts by asking whether individuals exhibit similar levels of
intra- and inter-ethnic trust. If ethnic origin does not influence trust, a sig-
nificant fraction of respondents should have identical levels of intra- and inter-
ethnic trust.
For each level of intra-ethnic trust, the distribution of inter-ethnic trust is
computed. Figure 4.2 illustrates these distributions, and each pie depicts a
level of intra-ethnic trust. In each pie, the biggest share of inter-ethnic trust is
of the same level as the one of intra-ethnic trust. For example, the individuals
who Somewhat trust their own group tend to Somewhat trust other groups.
Hence, individuals tend to trust members of other ethnic groups just as much
as they trust members of their own group.9 Nevertheless, individuals exhibit
non-negligible differences in intra- and inter-ethnic trust. In particular, when
they don’t trust individuals from other ethnic groups like their own group, in-
dividuals tend to trust them less. In Appendix H, it is shown that this result
also holds true at the country level (Table H.1).
It is, therefore, important to understand the various factors that shape eth-
nic trust. The rest of the chapter sheds light on the matter by analyzing the
factors associated with higher levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust.
9 This result can be related to Bannon, Miguel, and Posner (2004) who found that fewer than
one-third of African respondents identify themselves in ethnic terms. Indeed, “the majority
identify, instead, in terms of non-ethnic affiliations such as occupation.” The authors also found
important disparities across countries.
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Figure 4.2: Inter-Ethnic Trust by Levels of Intra-Ethnic Trust (Whole Sample)
not at all just a little
somewhat a lot
Not_At_All A_Little
Somewhat A_Lot
Graphs by q84c. trust people from your ethnic group
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4.4 Determinants of Intra-Ethnic Trust
Before examining regressions of inter-ethnic trust for each level of intra-ethnic
trust in the next section, this section analyzes the determinants of intra-ethnic
trust. This analysis helps us think about the factors that are likely to be impor-
tant for trust, and it provides a nice contrast for factors affecting inter-ethnic
trust. The characteristics of the individual, the ethnic group, the district, and
growth are included in an ordered probit regression whose marginal effects
are presented in Table 4.1.10 Each column in Table 4.1 depicts a level of intra-
ethnic trust. The detailed description of each variable is presented in Appendix
J.
4.4.1 Individual Characteristics
Most individual variables are strongly and significantly associated with the
intra-ethnic group.11 For instance, living in an urban district is associated
with lower levels of intra-ethnic trust. We will see in the next section that this
result contrasts with inter-ethnic trust. The regressions suggest that primary
education increases the probability that an individual trusts her own ethnic
group more; however but that post-secondary education is insignificant.
10 The regression relies on the same variables as the preferred regression that will be utilized
to examine inter-ethnic trust below.
11 For religions, the category Traditional religion is a category that is left out. The Primary
education dummy indicates no formal schooling, informal schooling only(which includes Ko-
ranic schooling), some primary schooling, or primary school completed. The Post-secondary ed-
ucation dummy indicates post-secondary qualifications other than university, some university,
university completed, or post-graduate. The category of education that is left out is secondary
education.
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4.4.2 Ethnic Group Determinants
Perceptions of unfair treatment of an ethnic group by the government are uti-
lized to capture a role for perceptions of discrimination at the ethnic group
level. The variable is constructed using the median of respondents’ answers
at the ethnic group level. The results suggest that this variable lowers intra-
ethnic trust.
A second set of ethnic group characteristics crosses district and country
characteristics: the share of the ethnic group and ethnic heterogeneity (or eth-
nic diversity). The index of ethnic diversity is inspired by Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2002) and is given by the following formula:
Diversityl = 1 
X
g
S2g;l
where l represents a location (district or country), g an ethnic group present
in location l, and Sg;l the share of ethnic group g in location l. It is found
that the share of the ethnic group (at both the district and national levels) is
insignificant. Ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of intra-ethnic
trust at the national level, but its effect is insignificant at the district level.
This peculiar result might be explained by endogenous sorting: those who are
trusting their own ethnic group more may be less likely to live with other ethnic
groups. Interestingly, a notion of endogenous sorting will also help understand
the relationship between ethnic diversity and inter-ethnic trust.
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4.4.3 District Characteristics
The district characteristics is another factor that potentially influences an in-
dividual’s trust. Specifically, Table 4.1 illustrates that the presence of socio-
economic infrastructures (e.g., market stalls) in a district is insignificant to
intra-ethnic trust. This contrasts with the positive correlation found for inter-
ethnic trust in the next section.
4.4.4 A Role for Economic Growth?
Finally, the link between intra-ethnic trust and growth rates is also examined.
Growth rates for the 1980-2004 period are collected from the Penn World Ta-
bles, Mark 6.3 as described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009). The average
growth rates for this period 1980-2004 are significantly and negatively associ-
ated with intra-ethnic trust.12
This seemingly counter-intuitive result is, nonetheless, consistent with re-
cessions increasing the formation of intra-ethnic trust. This is in line with
the idea that recessions lead to introverted assertion of one’s identity, whereby
members of the same ethnic group tend to rely more on each other in periods
of hardship. Such reliance on one’s ethnic group is in accordance with evidence
(from Africa or elsewhere) pertaining to coping mechanisms for income fluctua-
tions.13 A second interpretation-the reverse causality - will be discussed below
12 I also looked at the estimates associated with the average growth rates for 1990-2004,
1995-2004, and 2000-2004. I find that the estimates are negative for 1990-2004, positive for
1995-2004, and insignificant for 2000-04. The fact that growth over longer periods is significant
(while recent growth is not) is consistent with the results from inter-ethnic trust. However, the
association with inter-ethnic trust has the opposite sign.
13 For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) depicted how families in rural India rely on
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when the determinants of inter-ethnic trust are analyzed.
As it will be clear in the next section, though most factors generally affect
intra- and inter-ethnic trust in the same manner, important differences exist.
In particular, the signs or significance of the estimates associated with the
variables urban, and growth differ. These differences stress the importance of
analyzing inter-ethnic trust in relation to intra-ethnic trust instead of general
trust only. Inter-ethnic trust can now be studied for each individual category
of intra-ethnic trust.
4.5 Determinants of Inter-Ethnic Trust
For each level of intra-ethnic trust, I analyze regressions where the dependent
variable is the level of inter-ethnic trust. In all specifications, the interest is
in determining the variables (1) that are significantly associated with inter-
ethnic trust and (2) whose significance is consistent across levels of intra-ethnic
trust.14 Since the chapter contains numerous results, the emphasis is put on
the variables with strong and uniform significance across groups.
To determine whether variables increase the probability of occurrence of
marital arrangements to smooth consumption. Udry (1994) showed the extent to which in-
dividuals rely on informal credit transactions within villages in northern Nigeria. In these
papers, the family and the village, respectively, offer mechanisms that allow individuals to
resist income fluctuations. The coping mechanism involves a reduction of the commitment
problems (e.g., through marital arrangements) and informational problems (e.g., assessment
of one’s financial situation). One’s ethnic group could provide such mechanisms as well.
14 It should be noted that individuals who trust other ethnic groups more than their own
are not excluded. For example, the first specification in Table 4.2 relies on individuals with no
trust in their own group and, therefore, only on individuals with trust in other ethnic groups
that is greater than or equal to their trust in their own group.
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any given category, the analysis utilizes ordered probit specifications. For con-
venience, only the coefficients and not the marginal effects from the specifica-
tions are reported. The reader must bear this in mind and refrain from com-
paring estimates across different groups.15 The marginal effects (evaluated
at characteristic means) of the preferred regression are shown in Appendix I
(Tables I.1 to I.4).
All specifications include characteristics of the individual, the ethnic group,
and the district as well as growth. They correct for heteroscedasticity and clus-
ter the residuals at the district level. This formulation captures the possibility
that formal institutions vary within a country, possibly at the district level.
4.5.1 Individual Characteristics
I start by regressing the levels of inter-ethnic trust on a set of individual char-
acteristics. The ordered probit coefficients are presented in Table 4.2, where
each column depicts a level of intra-ethnic trust. The detailed description of
each independent variable is presented in appendixJ.
Age is strongly associated with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust across all
groups. This result-especially since it is the same as the one for intra-ethnic
trust-is consistent with the idea that trust in others increases with age, albeit
at a declining rate, as shown in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). Gender, the
15 Because there are more than two categories of inter-ethnic trust, the sign of the ordered
probit coefficients predicts the direction of the marginal effects in the extreme categories of
inter-ethnic trust (Not at All and A Lot) only. The coefficients do not determine the direction
of the marginal effects in the middle categories (A Little and Somewhat). In other words, the
signs of the coefficient estimates are always qualitatively consistent with the marginal effects
in the extreme categories, but not necessarily with the ones in the middle categories.
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urban district dummy (to which I will return in the district characteristics sub-
section), and religion are all only weakly associated with inter-ethnic trust.
An important variable is education. The specifications show that educa-
tion, as measured by primary and post-secondary education is inconsistently
associated with inter-ethnic trust.16 For example, more education is positively
associated with inter-ethnic trust for those with Some trust in their group, but
the correlation is negative for those with A little orA lot of trust in their group.
The fact that education has no effect or opposite effects for different groups of
individuals is surprising. Indeed, the hypothesis that education strengthens
“good” citizenry has received considerable support in the literature.17 The re-
sult can be related to the ambiguous role played by the elites (i.e., the more
educated) in Africa. As depicted by Maathai (2009), the latter often lack true
leadership and are ill disposed and ready to play the ethnic card if it suits their
interests. The result is also consistent with Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010),
who found that “ethnic identities matter in Africa for instrumental reasons: be-
cause they are useful in the competition for political power.” The results from
Table 4.2, therefore, reopen the discussion on the role that education plays in
the formation of an informed and engaged citizenry, especially in Africa.
16 The education category that is left out is secondary education.
17 For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found a positive effect of education on trust.
For a review of the benefits of education in general and on citizenship in particular, see Lochner
(2011).
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4.5.2 Ethnic Group Determinants
Table 4.3 adds ethnic group level controls in the specifications of Table 4.2,
whose coefficients are qualitatively unaffected. These controls are meant to
capture perceptions of discriminations at the ethnic group level. Specifically,
I rely on respondents’ perceptions about the evolution of the economic and po-
litical conditions of their ethnic group as well as on their perceptions about
unfair treatment of their ethnic group by the government. The controls are
then constructed using the medians of the respective variables at the ethnic
group level.
The perceptions of unfair treatment of the ethnic group by the government
(bottom panel) are the most significantly associated with lower levels of inter-
ethnic trust. This finding is consistent with the idea that discrimination, either
real or perceived, plays a significant role in trust and social cohesion. The
result is also consistent with Nunn and Wantchekon (2008) who found that
ethnic group characteristics, such as the number of slaves shipped out of Africa,
negatively and significantly affect various measures of interpersonal trust in
Africa.18
In Table 4.4, it is found that the share of the ethnic group at the district and
country levels (as defined earlier) has limited incidence on inter-ethnic trust.
Even though ethnic diversity at the district level is never significant, eth-
nic diversity at the country level is strongly and consistently associated with
18 The number of slaves in Nunn and Wantchekon (2008) is computed at the ethnic group
level and consists of the slaves that were shipped out of Africa during the 1400-1900 period.
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Table 4.3: Ethnic Group Determinants of Inter-Ethnic Trust by Level of Intra-Ethnic
Trust - Perceptions of Discriminations
Level of Intra-Ethnic Trust Not At All A Little Somewhat A Lot
[A] [B] [C] [D]
Perception of Discrimination: 0.055 -0.027 -0.054 -0.015
Worse Economic Condition of (0.063) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036)
the Ethnic Group
Pseudo Rsq 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.014
Perception of Discrimination: 0.109 -0.040 -0.104 -0.183
Worse Political Condition of (0.082) (0.052) (0.042) (0.062)
the Ethnic Group
Pseudo Rsq 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.015
Perception of Discrimination : -0.014 -0.107 -0.088 -0.082
Unfair Treatment by Government (0.060) (0.035) (0.032) (0.041)
Pseudo Rsq 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.014
N Obs. 2,821 6,287 6,098 5,129
Significance levels :  = 10%  = 5%    = 1%
Notes: Coefficients are ordered probit coefficients. In the estimating equations the
unit of observation is an individual. The standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for heteroscedasticity and cluster residuals at the district level. The perceptions of
discrimination are constructed at the ethnic group level using medians of respondents’
answers. All specifications include the variables listed in Table 4.2. A description of
each variable is offered in Appendix J.
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Table 4.4: Ethnic Group Determinants of Inter-Ethnic Trust by Level of Intra-Ethnic
Trust - Ethnic Share and Ethnic Diversity
Level of Intra-Ethnic Trust Not At All A Little Somewhat A Lot
[A] [B] [C] [D]
Urban -0.051 -0.001 0.019 -0.023
(0.078) (0.041) (0.041) (0.048)
Perception about the Ethnic Group: -0.050 -0.078 -0.068 -0.092
Unfair Treatment (0.064) (0.036) (0.033) (0.042)
Ethnic Share (District) 0.545 -0.130 -0.115 0.030
(0.203) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096)
Ethnic Share (Country) -0.565 -0.215 0.053 0.030
(0.294) (0.141) (0.158) (0.188)
Ethnic Diversity (District) 0.268 0.167 0.141 0.184
(0.238) (0.120) (0.111) (0.135)
Ethnic Diversity (Country) -0.135 -0.117 -0.128 -0.298
(0.050) (0.029) (0.032) (0.041)
N Obs. 2,821 6,287 6,098 5,129
Pseudo Rsq 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.027
Significance levels :  = 10%  = 5%    = 1%
Notes: Coefficients are ordered probit coefficients. In the estimating equations, the
unit of observation is an individual. The standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for heteroscedasticity and for clustering of the residuals at the district level. The trust
in the opposition is constructed at the ethnic group level using medians of respondents’
answers. Coefficients and standard errors associated with the country level index of
ethnic diversity are divided by 10. All specifications include the variables listed in
Table 4.2. A description of each variable is offered in Appendix J.
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lower levels of inter-ethnic trust. This result stresses the difficulty of establish-
ing trustworthy inter-ethnic relationship in countries where individuals are
from different ethnic origins. It also highlights the difficulty to put in prac-
tice Maathai’s view (2009) that African nation-states would flourish if ethnic
groups worked and lived together. Just like in the case of intra-ethnic groups,
the fact that ethnic diversity at the national level has a negative correlation
with inter-ethnic trust while no consistent correlation is found at the district
level might be explained by endogenous sorting: those who aremore trusting of
other ethnic groups may be more likely to live with other ethnic groups.19 The
implications of such a sorting are potentially consistent with conflicts occur-
ring in multi-ethnic countries where whole districts (or neighbourhoods) are
homogenous, yet little trust exists across communities. Another plausible but
simple explanation is that ethnic diversity at the national level is simply more
relevant for inter-ethnic trust since it is likely to relate to national politics and
national issues.
The results from Tables 4.1 and 4.3 suggest that ethnic diversity under-
mines the formation of trust; this is consistent with the literature, which pre-
dicts lower levels of trust among heterogeneous communities [e.g., Easterly
and Levine (1997); Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)].
The importance of the ethnic group level determinants underlines the com-
plex interactions between one’s own ethnic group identity, other ethnic groups,
19 Recall the previous notion of endogenous sorting (discussed in the section pertaining to
intra-ethnic trust): those who are more trusting of their own ethnic group may be less likely
to live with other ethnic groups. Though the two notions are slightly different, they do not
contradict each other.
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and the nation-state.20 As Maathai (2009) put it: “for many African peoples, a
threat to their micro-nation [her word for ethnic group] or those they consider
their leaders within their micro-nation, carries more weight than a threat to
the nation-state”. To foster and build higher levels of inter-ethnic trust, feel-
ings of threat or discrimination shall, therefore, be addressed.
The coefficients associated with the variable urban are reported since, with
respect to Table 4.2, they lose significance when ethnic group level charac-
teristics are introduced. The interpretation of this result is left for the next
subsection.
4.5.3 District Characteristics
The district characteristics is another factor that potentially influences an indi-
vidual’s inter-ethnic trust. Specifically, the social interactions that exist within
districts plausibly shape interpersonal trust, as demonstrated by Alesina and
La Ferrara (2002). In Table 4.5, I add district characteristics to the estimating
equation that includes the controls listed in both Tables 4.2 and 4.4. I also
continue to report the coefficients associated with the urban variable.
We can see that the estimates associated with most facilities or infrastruc-
tures have limited significance. However, market stalls are significantly cor-
related with more than one category of intra-ethnic trust. Along with recre-
ational facilities, they are good examples of places where inter-ethnic interac-
tions are possible and common. Recall that such infrastructures are
20 An interesting thing to do would be to investigate the interaction of inter-ethnic marriages
with inter-ethnic trust. Unfortunately, this data is not available in the Afrobarometer.
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Table 4.5: District Determinants of Inter-Ethnic Trust by Level of Intra-Ethnic
Trust
Level of Intra-Ethnic Trust Not At All A Little Somewhat A Lot
[A] [B] [C] [D]
Urban -0.141 -0.005 0.015 -0.020
(0.085) (0.045) (0.046) (0.050)
Services present in the district
School 0.222 0.036 -0.053 0.010
(0.113) (0.051) (0.062) (0.059)
Temple -0.129 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004
(0.100) (0.053) (0.059) (0.053)
Recreational Facilities 0.008 0.096 0.030 0.021
(0.084) (0.0428) (0.042) (0.045)
Community Building 0.020 -0.059 -0.025 0.019
(0.078) (0.045) (0.046) (0.057)
Market Stall 0.137 0.045 0.038 0.103
(0.081) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050)
N Obs. 2,592 5,846 5,704 4,810
Pseudo Rsq 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.028
Urban -0.085 -0.012 0.009 -0.041
(0.082) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048)
Market Stall 0.201 0.072 0.034 0.113
(0.073) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
N Obs. 2,775 6,203 6,001 5,042
Pseudo Rsq 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.029
Significance levels :  = 10%  = 5%    = 1%
Notes: Coefficients are ordered probit coefficients. In the estimating equations, the unit of observation is an
individual. The standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for clustering of the
residuals at the district level. All specifications include the variables listed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.4. The
bottom panel is the preferred regression. A description of each variable is offered in Appendix J.
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ambiguously, if not insignificantly, associated with intra-ethnic trust (Table 4.1).
These results are, therefore, in line with the idea that the presence of social in-
frastructures in a district can contribute to positive relations between ethnic
communities, not necessarily between ethnic groups. Interestingly, social fa-
cilities are at the heart of conflict mediation policies advocated by the United
Nations Development Program (also known as “infrastructures for peace” pro-
grams) or the World Bank (conflict prevention or post-conflict programs). The
estimates also suggest that districts with more inter-ethnic trust lead to more
of such infrastructures. The estimates also suggest that districts with more
inter-ethnic trust lead to more of such infrastructures. Unfortunately, disen-
tangling between the two interpretations is not feasible here. The preferred
regression (bottom panel in Table 4.5) keeps only market stalls; it should be
noted that the significance of the coefficient associated with market stalls in-
creases when I pull out other facilities.
This subsection concludes with an analysis of the coefficients associated
with the variable urban. It is interesting to note that, unlike regressions
of intra-ethnic trust (Table 4.1), controlling for ethnic composition and socio-
economic infrastructures in the regressions of inter-trust specification affects
the significance of the variable urban (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). This suggests that
ethnic composition and infrastructures “explain” the role of the variable urban
for inter-ethnic trust, but other features specific to cities matter for intra-ethnic
trust. In particular, the negative correlation between the urban variable and
intra-ethnic trust might be explained by the fact that individuals living in cities
have to, de facto, renege on part or all of the norms/traditions of their ethnic
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group. Ethnicity could, therefore, be a burden for individuals in cities (and
hence, a lack of trust) especially if these people have to support other members
of their group.21 The results highlight the importance of cities on the formation
of trust in African countries: not only do cities provide opportunities for inter-
action between members of different ethnic groups, but they also deeply affect
intra-ethnic interactions.
4.5.4 A Role for Economic Growth?
The last part of this section presents a key result of the chapter: the link be-
tween inter-ethnic trust and growth rates (Table 4.6).22 It is established that
growth rates over the 15 or 25 years that preceded the survey are consistently,
significantly, and positively associated with inter-ethnic trust. However, the
association between recent growth rates (5 years) and inter-ethnic trust is in-
significant. Higher levels of inter-ethnic trust are thus correlated with sus-
tained growth over long periods of time. Because causality between growth
and trust is likely to be an issue, two interpretations are plausible.
On one hand, the result is consistent with recessions undermining the for-
mation of inter-ethnic trust, which can be linked to evidence from the litera-
ture, which finds an effect of economic activities on ethnic relationships
21 Such a behaviour can be linked to the concept of acculturation, which has been studied in
psychology and sociology.
22 Recall that growth rates are collected for the 1980-2004 period from the PennWorld Tables,
Mark 6.3, as described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
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[e.g., Peil (1975); Rohner et al. (2011 and 2012)].23 On the other hand, the level
of growth is likely to be endogenous with respect to the level of inter-ethnic
trust: countries with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust should, ceteris paribus,
experience higher levels of economic growth. This is in line with Putnam (1993)
or LaPorta et al. (1997 and 1999). The regressions from Table 4.6 might just
capture this relation.
It is interesting to link the estimates from this section to the ones observed
for intra-ethnic trust. Tables 4.1 and 4.6 respectively show that intra-ethnic
trust is countercyclical, whereas inter-ethnic trust is procyclical, which sug-
gests important relationships between growth and the dynamics of trust. For
instance, one interpretation is that long recessions undermine social cohesion
since they increase the gap between intra- and inter-ethnic trust.24 This view
contributes to understanding why, despite decades of stability, ethno-political
crises erupted in some African countries (e.g., Coˆte d’Ivoire or Kenya) during
their long and deep economic recessions. Another interpretation simply sug-
gests that countries with bigger gaps between intra- and inter-ethnic trust (and
implicitly lower social cohesion) tend to have lower growth rates.
Regardless of the direction of causality, the results presented here are con-
sistent with the idea of self-reinforcing mechanisms between growth and social
capital. They serve as motivation for a deeper analysis of the links between
23 Specifically, Peil (1975) found that inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are “really about eco-
nomic and political power”. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2011) showed that conflicts across
communities lead to less trade, which perpetuates further collapse of trust and social capital.
The same authors found a causal effect of conflicts on ethnic trust in Uganda [Rohner et al.
(2012)].
24 The implicit assumption here is that social cohesion is likely to be hampered when indi-
viduals exhibit gaps between inter- and intra-ethnic trust.
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economic growth and the dynamics of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, which, un-
fortunately, cannot be addressed with the data at hand.
4.6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the determinants of inter-ethnic relations by focusing on
the relationship between inter- and intra-ethnic trust. Using survey data from
the Afrobarometer, it is first found that, though most individuals have simi-
lar levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, differences exist for a non-negligible
fraction of them. In simple words, ethnic origin matters to trust. The study
investigates the factors that are significantly associated with inter-ethnic trust
for each level of intra-ethnic group. By means of ordered probit regressions, it
is shown that four categories of factors matter and that the strongest factors
associated with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust are
1. an individual’s characteristics (e.g., age);
2. ethnic group characteristics (e.g., belonging to a group that does not feel
treated unfairly or politically discriminated against);
3. district characteristics including living in a district with social infrastruc-
tures (e.g., markets); and
4. country characteristics (e.g., living in a country with homogeneous ethnic
groups and sustained growth over long periods of time).
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Gender and religious beliefs are weakly associated with inter-ethnic trust.
Surprisingly, the relationship between education and inter-ethnic trust is am-
biguous: its coefficients are often not significant, and its signs change with
the intra-ethnic trust category. This result can be related to the ambiguous
role played by the elites (“the most educated”) in Africa, and it reopens the
discussion on the role that education plays in the formation of good citizenry,
especially in Africa.
Interestingly, key variables, such as district characteristics and growth,
have different correlations with inter- or intra-ethnic trust. First, this com-
parison shows the importance of cities on the formation of trust in African
countries: cities not only provide opportunities for interaction between mem-
bers of different ethnic groups, but they also deeply affect intra-ethnic inter-
actions. Second, the contrast between the procyclicality of inter-ethnic trust
and the countercyclicality of intra-ethnic trust supports the idea that long re-
cessions undermine social cohesion since they increase the gap between intra-
and inter-ethnic trust. Alternatively, they also suggest that countries with
bigger gaps between intra- and inter-ethnic trust (and implicitly lower social
cohesion) tend to have lower growth rates.
The results of the chapter serve as motivation for a deeper analysis of the
dynamic links between economic growth and intra- and inter-ethnic trust. In
this respect, the interaction between long-term growth and some variables,
(e.g., infrastructure) demands more attention. The construction of social in-
frastructures is, indeed, related to growth rates, especially in Africa, where the
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government is a key investor. For example, countries that were hit by deep eco-
nomic crises in the 1980-1990s agreed to Structural Adjustment Plans and had
to stop investing in social infrastructure (e.g., recreational facilities). Hence, a
thorough understanding of the complex links between growth and inter-ethnic
relations requires a refinement of the data. Understanding what are the chan-
nels of transmission and self-reinforcement between growth and trust will help
design better national and international policies.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature related to the macroe-
conomics of development. The first chapter provides evidence on the impor-
tance of educational corruption. It develops a model whose key feature is a
corruptible university. Specifically, incompetent students can get diplomas if
they pay a bribe. This generates two channels by which corruption affects the
economy. The first is a direct channel in which incompetent students with
diplomas lower production due to their lack of skills. The second is an indirect,
or feedback, effect that undermines the quality of the teacher pool (as teach-
ers are hired from the pool of graduates). Consequently, the creation of skills
diminishes, and fewer competent workers are available for production. This
channel has not been previously discussed in the literature.
Based on data on educational corruption, the public sector, college enroll-
ment and completion rates, the model is then calibrated. The benchmarkmodel
is able to replicate key features of the data. It also gives an idea of the impact of
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corruption on the quality of teachers. Hence, the most corrupted countries (the
countries with more than 10% of people paying a bribe in the education sec-
tor) have a teacher quality, that is only 69% of the quality of other countries.
Such a low quality of teachers has dramatic implications for the creation of
knowledge. For example, a student with the highest ability level (=1) has only
an 80% probability of becoming competent in the most corrupted countries. In
comparison, this probability is close to 100% in the least corrupted countries
Finally, counterfactual experiments are implemented. The key result from
these experiments is that the feedback channel is quantitatively more impor-
tant than the direct channel. For instance, the most corrupted countries could
gain 9% in output if the indirect channel was removed; this represents roughly
tenfold the gains from the removal of the direct channel. Moreover, removing
corruption in these countries would yield a 22% gain in output.
The second chapter of this thesis sheds light on the institutions that sup-
port high levels of corruption. It considers the latter as a social endemic phe-
nomenon and analyzes the ways in which civil society can help to in reduce it.
This novel approach complements existing work on the role of social norms and
non-pecuniary motivations for corruption.
The model expands on a simple corruption framework with bureaucrats and
citizens, and the engagement of the civil society is modeled as its effectiveness
in catching/punishing misbehaving agents. The dynamic evolution of honesty
within the population is affected by both pecuniary (e.g., wages or the probabil-
ity of getting caught) and non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., morality) in a manner
that borrows from Francois and Zabojnik (2005). It is found that a greater
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involvement of civil society can effectively reduce the level of corruption but
has an ambiguous effect on social capital. This stresses an important result:
countries enjoy lower levels of corruption not necessarily because they have
more honest citizens (i.e., more social capital), but rather because lower levels
of corruption are tolerated for each level of honest citizens. Interestingly, wage
policies are shown to be ineffective at reducing corruption in this economic en-
vironment.
Despite limitations, the analysis of the Afrobarometer survey data suggests
that the predictions of the model are supported by the data. The results are
robust for several specifications, including five different definitions of corrup-
tion, as well as for controlling for the endogeneity of civic engagement by using
an instrumental variable approach. In addition, the results suggest that the
causality goes from civic engagement to corruption.
The final chapter analyzes the determinants of inter-ethnic relations by fo-
cusing on the relationship between inter- and intra-ethnic trust. Based on
survey data from the Afrobarometer, it is first found that, even though most in-
dividuals have similar levels of intra- and inter-ethnic trust, differences exist
for a non-negligible fraction of them. Therefore, ethnic origin matters for trust.
The chapter then investigates the factors that are significantly associated with
inter-ethnic trust for each level of intra-ethnic group.
By means of ordered probit regressions, it is established that the factors
consistently associated with higher levels of inter-ethnic trust include (i) the
age of the individuals; (ii) their belonging to a group that does not feel treated
unfairly by the government; (iii) their living in a district with socio-economic
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infrastructures like markets; (iv) their living in a country with homogeneous
ethnic groups and with sustained growth over long periods of time. Gender and
religious beliefs are weakly correlated with inter-ethnic trust. Surprisingly,
education is ambiguously and inconsistently associated with inter-ethnic trust.
Interestingly, key variables such as district characteristics and growth have
different correlations with inter- and intra-ethnic trust. First, this compari-
son shows the importance of cities in the formation of trust in African coun-
tries. Cities not only provide opportunities of interaction between members of
different ethnic groups, but they also deeply affect intra-ethnic interactions.
Second, the contrast between the procyclicality of inter-ethnic trust and the
countercyclicality of intra-ethnic trust supports the idea that long recessions
undermine social cohesion since they increase the gap between intra- and inter-
ethnic trust. Alternatively, they also suggest that countries with bigger gaps
between intra- and inter-ethnic trust (and, implicitly, lower social cohesion)
tend to have lower growth rates.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
A.1 Proposition 1: Bribe or Not?
Proposition 1 establishes a cutoff !

ce; b; PS; F; ;
wL
wH

of agents who shall
bribe. Formally, a student with wealth ! would bribe if
V BIncpt(!)  V BIncpt(!)
, ln (!   ce   b) +  [ ln (wH) + (1  ) ln (wL)]  ln (!   ce) +  ln (wL)
, ln

!   ce   b
!   ce

 ln

wL
wH

, !  ce + b
1 

wL
wH
  !(ce; b; PS; F; ; wLwH )
where   1 PS (1 )F and   max

NPS
N I
; 1
	
. Hence an agent with wealth
! would bribe if and only if his wealth exceeds !(ce; b; PS; F; ; wLwH ). 
I then investigate the effects of the direct cost of education (ce), the amount
of the bribe (b), the government and firms’ screening (PS and F) and the prob-
ability an incompetent get hired in the public sector (). First I establish the
behaviour of , I find
@ 
@ F
=   (1  ) < 0 ; @ 
@ PS
=   < 0 ; @ 
@ 
= F   PS > 0:
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Using the latter derivatives and the fact that wL < wH , it follows that
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Thus an increase of either the direct cost of education, the size of the bribe or
government and firm’s screening raise the threshold. An easier access to gov-
ernment jobs for incompetent and an increase of the skilled wage premium (wH
wL
)
decreases the threshold and makes corruption more appealing. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1. 
A.2 Proposition 2: Enter University or Not?
I now characterize the decision to enter University. I abuse notation and
rewrite !() where  is the aggregate state vector as defined in the text. I
use the cutoff !() from Proposition 1. Hence I have two cases depending on
whether an agent’s wealth exceeds !() or not. Let agents with wealth below
the cutoff be referred as the Poor and those above as the Rich. Recall that
p(; Q) is the probability to become competent and takes the form
p(; Q)   + (1  )Q  	
where 	  + (1  )Q and the last equivalence is used for notational sake.
First Case: The Poor, ! < !()
Such agents know they cannot bribe in the event they become incompetent.
They would enter University if
VU (;! < !)  VNU (;!)
, ln(!   ce) +  [p(; Q) ln(wH) + (1  p(; Q) lnwL)]  ln(! + wL) +  ln(wL)
, ln(!   ce) +  [	 ln(wH) + (1  	 lnwL)]  ln(! + wL) +  ln(wL)
, 	 ln

wH
wL

 ln

! + wL
!   ce

,  
ln

!+wL
! ce

	 ln

wH
wL
  P (!; ce; b; PS; F; ; wHwL ; Q)
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Hence a poor would enter University if and only if her ability is above the
cutoff P (:). The cutoff directly depends on !,
wH
wL
andQ, and indirectly (through
!()) on b, F and PS.
Let’s see the comparative-statics induced by a change in !, Q, wH
wL
, b, F and
PS. It is easy to see that
@ P
@ !
=   1
	 ln

wH
wL
 (wL+ce)
(! ce)(!+wL) < 0 ;
@ P
@ Q
=   (1 ) ln

wH
wL

ln(!+wL! ce )h
	 ln

wH
wL
i2 < 0
@ P
@

wH
wL
 =   	

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wL

ln(!+wL! ce )h
	 ln

wH
wL
i2 < 0 ; @ P@ b = @ P@  = @ P@ PS = @ P@ F = 0:
The first derivative tells us that wealth diminishes the ability cutoff hence
wealthier agents tends to enter University. Similarly, the quality of teachers
induces more students to enroll; since corruption affects Q in equilibrium (the
feedback effect) one should expect more corruption to induce fewer entries. The
third derivative says that if the skilled premium increases more people will
enter University. The last four effects are nil highlighting the fact that once
an agent anticipates she cannot pay the bribe, the amount of the bribe, the
government intervention and the tightness for public sector jobs do not matter
anymore for the decision to enter University. 
Second Case: The Rich, !  !()
Such agents know they can bribe and obtain a diploma in the event they are
incompetent. Hence they would enter University if
VU (;!  !)  VNU (; !)
, 	 [ln(!   ce) +  ln(wH)] + : : :
(1  	) fln (!   ce   b) +  [ ln (wH) + (1  ) ln(wL)]g  ln(! + wL) +  ln(wL)
, 	

ln

!   ce
!   ce   b

+ 

(1  ) ln

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wL

 ln

! + wL
!   ceb

   ln

wH
wL

,  
ln

!+wL
! ce b

   ln

wH
wL

	
n
ln

! ce
! ce b

+ 
h
(1  ) ln wH
wL
io  R(!; ce; b; F; PS; ; wHwL ; Q)
with   1  PS   (1  )F
Working the comparative statics using R(:) is cumbersome. I rather rely
on the Implicit Function Theorem which simplifies tremendously the analysis.
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Hence I rewrite the expression of the last equivalence as


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It follows that first order derivatives for  are
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[ + (1  )R] > 0
Further we have @	
@ Q
> 0, @ 
@ PS
< 0, @ 
@ F
< 0 and @ 
@ 
> 0. Using the Implicit
Function Theorem it follows that
@ R
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R
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The analysis of R (:) is thus similar to the one of P (:). Hence the first
derivative tells us that wealth diminishes the ability cutoff hence wealthier
agents tends to enter University. Similarly, the quality of teachers induces
more students to enroll; since corruption affects Q in equilibrium (the feedback
effect) one should expect more corruption to induce fewer entries. The third
154
derivative says that if the skilled premium increases more people will enter
University. The size of the bribe and the probability of being caught increase
the cutoff of ability: if it is costly to bribe students with higher probability to
become incompetent won’t enter University.
Finally, is R (:) greater or smaller than P (:)? First we know that
 R (:) is decreasing in ! and is defined on

!(); !Max

. Therefore the
maximum value for R (:) is achieved at !().
 R (:) is decreasing in ! and is defined on [0; !()[. Therefore the mini-
mum value for P (:) is achieved at !().
Using the expression for !(), it can be shown that
P (!; ce; b; F; PS; ;
wH
wL
; Q) =
ln

1 +

1 

wL
wH

 ce+wL
b

	 ln wH
wL
(A.1)
Further by evaluating P (:) at !    with  2 R+ close to zero, we get
P (!   ; ce; b; F; PS; ;
wH
wL
; Q) =
ln
0@ ce+wL + b1 ( wLwH )
b
1 ( wLwH )
 
1A
	 ln wH
wL
>
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0@ ce+wL+ b1 ( wLwH )
b
1 ( wLwH )

1A
	 ln wH
wL
=
ln

1 +

1 

wL
wH

 ce+wL
b

	 ln wH
wL
= R(!; :)
where the inequality comes from the fact that adding  to both the numerator
and the denominator increases the top expression. It is then immediate that
the maximum value for R (:) (expression (A.1)), is lower that the minimum
value of P (:). Cutoffs of ability for rich are therefore lower that the ones of
poor. This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Appendix B
Aggregate Measures of Entrants,
Graduates and Competent
Using Propositions 1 and 2, one can derive expressions for the number of en-
trants (NE), graduates (NG) and competent (NC) in the economy. NE is the sum
of agents, rich or poor, whose ability exceeds the respective cutoff. Because in-
competent rich are able to bribe they obtain a diploma and NG is the sum of all
rich and competent poor. Finally the number of competent, NC would be the
sum of competent rich and poor that enter University.
For notational sake I abstract from the aggregate . Let f() and g(!) de-
note the probability distributions of  and ! on [0; 1] and [0; !max] respectively;
both distributions are assumed uniform. Recall that the probability to become
competent is p(;Q) = 	, it follows that
NE =
Z !
0
Z 1
P (!)
f()g(!) dd! +
Z !max
!
Z 1
R(!)
f()g(!) dd!
=
1
!max
Z !
0
(1  P (!)) d! +
Z !max
!
(1  R(!)) d!

NE = 1  1
!max
Z !
0
P (!) d! +
Z !max
!
R(!) d!

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Z !
0
Z 1
P (!)
	f()g(!) dd! +
Z !max
!
Z 1
R(!)
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0
1
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0
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0
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0
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Z !
0
Z 1
P (!)
	f()g(!) dd! +
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Z 1
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= 1  	
2!max
Z !
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2P (!) d! +
Z !max
!
2R(!) d!

N I = NG  NC:
157
Appendix C
Description of the Data for the
Parametrization
This section describes the data used in the quantitative section of Chapter 2.
Specifically, data on corruption in the education sector, education aggregates,
public sector employment, employment of the College educated and output per
capita are collected.
As a measure of the proportion of incompetent who pays a bribe, I rely on
the proportions of people who paid a bribe in the education sector from Trans-
parency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB).1
The GCB is a survey that assesses public opinions regarding corruption in
public sectors, government actions against corruption and the evolution of cor-
ruption. Respondents are men and women aged 15+ and samples have been
weighted to bring them in line with national and global populations. Accord-
ing to Transparency International’s website,“GCB is the only worldwide public
opinion survey on perception and experience of corruption.”2 A clear limitation
for the purpose of the chapter is that the GCB does not make any distinction
between education levels and the reason of the payment. This constraint may
1Specifically I use those who answered “yes” to the question: “ In the past 12 months, have
you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to each of the following insti-
tution/organization? Education system”
2For a complete description of the GCB go to http://www.transparency.org
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impose a bias on my calibration. I nevertheless rely on GCB for 3 reasons: (1)
it is the closest measure of corruption in University that I am aware of; (2) it
covers a big set of countries, and (3) it is comparable year to year.3 This gives
us data on corruption for 81 countries for years 2006 to 2008. Table 2.1 shows
summary statistics for this education corruption measure.
As a measure of University attendance (NE) and University Graduates (NG)
I rely on UNESCO data. I use available data on the period 1997-2008 of Gross
Enrollment Ratio and Gross Completion Ratio at the tertiary level (ISCED 5
and 6); these rates are expressed in percentage of the relevant age group.
The measure of output per capita is obtained from the real chain-weighted
series RGDPCH of the PennWorld Table, Mark 6.3 which is detailed in Heston,
Summers and Aten (2009). I extract all available data for years 1990 to 2007.
We next collect data on the public sector.
Recall that public servants (NPS) in the model are hired from the pool of col-
lege graduates. Unfortunately cross-national data set on active population by
education level and occupation are not available. To remedy this shortcoming
I construct a variable that approximates the fraction of graduate that works in
the public sector. I first collect data on public sector employment (Total Gov-
ernment) from International Labour Office(ILO)’s LABORSTA. This measure
gives me a figure of the size of the public sector, say P . From the same source,
I then collect data on employment by level of education and data on the total
active population aged 15+. I combine the 2 data sets and construct a variable,
say F , that stands for the fraction of the total active population with Univer-
sity education. I finally apply this fraction to the size of the public sector (i.e I
do F P ) to obtain a crude approximation of the share of the active population
that works in the public sector and has a College Education. By doing this I im-
plicitly assume that the fraction of public servants with college education is the
same as the fraction of college educated in the economically active population.
The data runs from 1990 to 2007.
For the skilled wage premia, I use data from the Occupational Wages around
the World (OWW) Database as depicted in Freeman and Oostendorp (2005).
The authors collect wages from diverse occupations and industries over the
world. Specifically, I use the “x3wl” data set which uses a country-specific
3Another measure of corruption widely used is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) also
available from Transparency International. The advantage of CPI is that it has been collected
since 1995 and it covers more than a hundred countries. Shaw (2007) for example uses CPI to
highlight the effect of educational corruption. A limit of CPI however is that it is a measure of
bureaucratic corruption and it does not focus on education.
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and uniform calibration with lexicographic weighting. I then compute aver-
age wages by occupation over the period 1990-2003 and retrieve the associated
percentiles distribution. I finally construct the skilled wage premia by taking
the ratio of the 80th to 20th percentiles of the distribution.
For all variables, I consider the means of all available data. The final sample
consists of countries that have observations for all variables. This yields 25
countries.4 The most restrictive data set is the one concerning the public sector:
around 40 countries, mostly among the most corrupted countries, do not have
data on the public sector.
4 It should be acknowledged that the data set is limited. The most obvious problem is that
the periods covered and the length of the series are not the same. This is particularly true
for the educational corruption variable. Another issue is the fact that the share of College
educated in the public sector might be higher or lower than in the active population.
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Appendix D
Parametrization Results
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Figure D.1: Targets of Calibration.
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(a) College Enrollments.
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(b) College Graduates.
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(c) Proportion of Students Paying a Bribe.
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(d) Skilled Wage Premia.
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Figure D.2: Predictions from the model for the University.
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(a) Measure of Incompetent Graduates.
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(b) Quality of the Pool of Graduates.
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(c) Quality of The Pool of Teachers.
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Figure D.3: Predictions from the model for the Labor Market and Production.
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Table D.1: Calibrated Values
Country Cost of Education Size of the Bribe Government Screening Firm Screening
ce (% !Max) b (% !Max) PS F
Argentina 0.1146 0.1446 0.6735 0.8734
Sweden 0.0298 0.1415 0.6499 0.7138
Norway 0.0323 0.1582 0.6639 0.7176
Hungary 0.1027 0.2388 0.5053 0.6954
Canada 0.0831 0.2566 0.5511 0.5785
South Africa 0.3997 0.2060 0.5834 0.7748
Denmark 0.0409 0.1948 0.5648 0.6842
Poland 0.0761 0.1817 0.6176 0.7971
Netherlands 0.0848 0.2135 0.5853 0.7662
Japan 0.1003 0.2065 0.5825 0.7535
United States 0.0345 0.1817 0.5788 0.7060
Finland 0.0035 0.0940 0.6598 0.8598
Lithuania 0.0819 0.2427 0.5494 0.6965
Croatia 0.2599 0.2661 0.5366 0.6670
United Kingdom 0.0738 0.2095 0.5674 0.7199
Czech Republic 0.1887 0.2907 0.4366 0.5872
Bulgaria 0.1860 0.3467 0.4081 0.4186
Turkey 0.3409 0.2809 0.4942 0.5791
Hong Kong 0.2467 0.2347 0.5209 0.7188
Mexico 0.3700 0.2611 0.4509 0.6394
Colombia 0.2723 0.3076 0.4865 0.4868
Romania 0.1951 0.4500 0.1175 0.1175
Russia 0.1050 0.3815 0.4069 0.4247
Philippines 0.2420 0.3445 0.3369 0.3369
Azerbaijan 0.4726 0.3124 0.0765 0.1128
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Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 3
(This section borrows from Francois and Zabojnik (2005).)
I establish the existence of the interior-valued steady state, and then show
that it is always stable.
Consider the expected returns to honesty relative to opportunism E[UHt ]  
E[UOt ] as given by expression Z. Suppose the sufficient condition holds so that
there exists at least one value of , denoted 0 such that 0 [   ! (1  p(0)(C + B))] <
0. Then there must exist another value of  denoted A with 0 < A < 1 such
that A

   !  1  p(A)(C + B) = 0. This follows immediately from the con-
tinuity of p in , and Assumption 1. Moreover, by the properties of the first and
second derivatives of (3.7), and assumption (5) this point is unique. At this
point, which is point A in Figure 3.1, we have that the first derivative is
   !  1  p(A)(C + B)+ !(C + B) p0(A) > 0:
Note that for  > A, Z   [   ! (1  p()(C + B))] > 0. However, for
 < A, the opposite holds (this is from the continuity and boundedness of
p, from the properties of the first and second derivatives of (3.7), and from
assumption (2)). The evolutionary implications of these  ranges for d in the
,  space are depicted by the vertical arrows in Figure 3.2.
Now consider how bureaucrats’ behaviour is affected by types in the pop-
ulation. That is, consider expression (3.6). The critical relationship in (; p)
space is:
d = (; ) = 0 (E.1)
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with (; )  (1  ) !
2
(1  p()(C + B))

.
On this locus of  and p values, bureaucrats are indifferent between honesty
and corruption and d = 0. Intuitively, the condition states that for higher lev-
els of , only lower levels of corruption can be supported in the economy. Since
@(;)
@
< 0 and since under (5) @(;)
@
< 0, this function is downward sloping in
the (; p) space. Thus, to maintain the condition, an increase (decrease) in  is
offset by an immediate decrease (increase) in .
Moreover, for values of  and p above the function, we have that d =
(; ) < 0, so that there is an adjustment towards bureaucrats being honest.
The converse is true for points below the function.
When  = 1, (1; ) = 0;8 , at  = 0 in particular. When  = 1, from
Assumption 4, (E.1) can never hold, even for  = 0; thus for  = 0, (E.1) only
holds for  < 1. Let C be s.t. (0; C)=0. It can be proven by contradiction that
C is greater than A depicted above.1
Thus the d = 0 function is downward sloping, cuts the vertical axis at 1
at  = 0, and below 0 at  = 1. The dynamics for bureaucrats are depicted in
Figure 3.2.
The steady states occur when d = 0 and d = 0. Since for all values
of  2 [0; 1], the d = 0 locus takes positive values of , with  < 1, and
since, under the assumed sufficient condition A and B are elements of (0; 1), it
follows, necessarily that there exist two such points. I denote these by (A; A)
and (B; B). Figure 3.3 illustrates the steady states and phase spaces.
Stability:
I now show that (A; A) is locally stable.
First from the law of motion of bureaucrats, in the interior, necessarily,
d = 0 always. Furthermore, d
d
< 0 in the interior. Since the  adjustment
is immediate to ensure this equality, the stability of the system is determined
by an analysis of the d equation. Recall this equation is:
d = (1  ) ( [   ! (1  p()(C + B))])
The derivative with respect to  is:
d2 =
d
d
[(1  )]  (:) + (1  )d (:)
d
1 Suppose that A > C then p(A) > p(C) and it follows that !2
 
1  p(A)(C + B)

<
!
2
 
1  p(C)(C + B)

= 0 meaning that !
 
1  p(A)(C + B)

< 0. This latter expression
implies that A

   !  1  p(A)(C + B) > 0 which contradicts that it should be 0 (the
condition that determines B). Thus A must be smaller than C .
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At the interior steady state,  (:) = 0, so that the first term cancels. The sign
then depends on the second term which can be re-expressed as follows:
d2 = (1  )d (:)
d
= (1  )d (:)
d
d
d
From above d
d
< 0, and d
d
= 0 f   ! (1  p()(C + B)) + !(C + B) p0()g :
Since from the assumed properties of (:), we have 0 > 0, it follows that
the sign of d
d
depends on the expression in brackets. At (A; A), we have
   !  1  p(A)(C + B)+ !(C + B) p0(A) > 0:
where the sign follows from (E). Thus, since this implies d2 < 0, the steady
state is stable at A. 
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Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 4
If  = 1, d > 0 from assumption 1. If  = 0, we have (; ) < 0 so that d < 0.
It follows that ( = 0;  = 1) is not a steady state. 
From (3.6),  = 1 implies d = 0. Also, if  = 0, d = 0 from (3.7). These
results imply that ( = 1;  = 0) is a steady state. To verify stability, con-
sider perturbations around the equilibrium. Near ( = 1;  = 1), the evolu-
tionary incentives induced by assumptions 1 to 5, favour opportunism so that
any perturbations around the equilibrium leads to movement away it. Hence,
 = 1;  = 0) is not a stable steady state.
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Appendix G
Description of the Data for
Chapter 3
This section presents the variables that are utilized in Section 3.4. All vari-
ables are obtained from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer surveys
Measures of corruption (Dependant variables)
Pay bribe for / to A Document or a Permit; School Placement; House-
hold Services; Get Medicine or Medical Attention; Avoid Problem
w/ Police: individual’s answer to the question In the past year, how often
(if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to govern-
ment officials in order to: Get a document or a permit; Get a child into
school; Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone); Get
medicine or medical attention; Avoid a problem with the police (passing
a checkpoint, avoid a fine or arrest). Answers are “Never” (0), “Once or
Twice” (1), “A few Times” (2) or “Often” (3).
Social Capital (Dependant variables)
Would Bribe if encountering a misbehaving school or clinical: by
country, fraction of individuals who answer “Offer tip or bribe” to the
question: What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the
following situations: You suspected a school or clinic official of stealing?
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Would Bribe if encountering delays to get a government permit:
by country, fraction of individuals who answer “Offer tip or bribe” to the
question: What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the
following situations: You were waiting for a government permit or license,
but kept encountering delays?
Would Bribe in the event of a wrongful arrest in the family: by coun-
try, fraction of individuals who answer “Offer tip or bribe” to the question:
What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the following sit-
uations: The police wrongly arrested someone in your family?
Would Bribe in the event of a wrongly seized family land: by coun-
try, fraction of individuals who answer “Offer tip or bribe” to the question:
What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the following sit-
uations: Someone wrongly seized your familys land?
Would Bribe in the event of a wrongly seized family land: by coun-
try, fraction of individuals who answer “Offer tip or bribe” to the question:
What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the following sit-
uations: Election officials left your name off the voters roll?
Civic Engagement
Join Others to Raise an Issue: by country, fraction of individuals who
answer “Yes, several times” or “Yes, often” to the question: For each of
these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things
during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Got
together with others to raise an issue?
Instruments
Frequent Use of Media: by country, fraction of individuals who get
news at least a few times a week from either the radio, television or
newspapers.
Women as Leaders: by country, fraction of individuals who “very
strongly agree” that women should have the same chance of being
elected to political office as men.
Miscellaneous Data
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Primary Education: Constructed from the education question (Ques-
tion q90). Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has any
the following education level: No formal Schooling, Informal Schooling
only (includes Koranic Schooling), Some Primary Schooling or Primary
School Completed.
Post Secondary Education: Constructed from the education question
(Question q90). Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent
has any of the following education level: Post-secondary qualifications,
other than university, Some University, University Completed, or Post-
Graduate.
West Africa: Dummy variable that takes value 1 for the following coun-
tries Benin, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.
Ethnic Diversity: The index of ethnic diversity follows Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) and is given by the following formula:
Fragmentationc = 1 
X
g
S2g;d
where c represents a country, g an ethnic group present in country c and
Sg;c the share of ethnic group g in country c.
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Appendix H
Mean Distributions of Intra- and
Inter-Ethnic Trust by Country
We can see that the tendency observed for the whole sample is confirmed at the
country level: individuals tend to trust members from other groups like they
trust members of their own group. When they don’t trust individuals from
other ethnic groups like their own group, respondents tend to trust them less.
In Table H.1 this concept is captured by the fact that, for each country, shares
are bigger on the left than on the right of the diagonal.
173
Table H.1: Intra and Inter Ethnic Trust - Mean Distributions by Country
Countries Trust in Own Ethnic Trust in Other Ethnic Groups (cross-tabulations)
Group (% Population) Not at All Just a Little Somewhat A Lot
Benin Not at All 21.2 89.5 7.3 1.6 1.6
Just a Little 35.8 15.8 80.1 2.4 1.7
Somewhat 22.3 5.0 42.3 50.0 2.7
A Lot 20.7 8.3 10.8 11.6 69.3
Botswana Not at All 28.7 92.7 5.1 1.6 0.6
Just a Little 30.6 11.5 79.9 7.1 1.5
Somewhat 20.6 7.1 11.0 74.9 7.1
A Lot 20.1 8.6 7.7 15.3 68.5
Ghana Not at All 15.4 84.1 8.5 5.7 1.7
Just a Little 28.7 12.5 80.5 5.5 1.5
Somewhat 30.9 12.2 21.8 63.6 2.5
A Lot 25.1 9.1 13.9 18.5 58.5
Kenya Not at All 8.01 86.0 12.8 1.3 0.0
Just a Little 44.6 26.5 68.2 4.8 0.6
Somewhat 32.6 7.7 35.6 55.0 1.7
A Lot 14.9 15.0 22.7 20.1 42.3
Lesotho Not at All 19.7 93.8 4.0 1.3 0.9
Just a Little 32.5 11.5 79.3 7.9 1.3
Somewhat 30.2 6.7 22.2 67.4 3.7
A Lot 17.5 10.8 19.3 25.7 44.2
Madagascar Not at All 6.1 84.6 10.0 3.5 2.0
Just a Little 42.3 11.7 82.6 5.6 0.1
Somewhat 42.8 7.1 34.2 58.5 0.2
A Lot 8.8 10.1 16.4 28.0 45.6
Malawi Not at All 7.2 81.0 15.2 3.8 0.0
Just a Little 19.9 19.1 70.0 5.0 5.9
Somewhat 18.3 10.4 25.2 60.4 4.0
A Lot 54.6 13.0 11.5 9.8 65.8
Mali Not at All 7.0 80.6 8.5 9.5 1.4
Just a Little 16.6 20.5 65.5 10.6 3.4
Somewhat 30.6 10.7 28.9 56.0 4.4
A Lot 45.8 9.7 17.6 21.0 51.7
Notes: Countries’ means are computed by Trust in one’s own ethnic group. Means are weighted using the variable combinwt.
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Table H.2: Intra and Inter Ethnic Trust - Mean Distributions by Country (continued)
Countries Trust in Own Ethnic Trust in Other Ethnic Groups (cross-tabulations)
Group (% Population) Not at All Just a Little Somewhat A Lot
Mozambique Not at All 12.0 79.4 8.7 5.6 6.3
Just a Little 21.9 18.8 68.6 8.3 4.4
Somewhat 25.5 8.6 18.7 64.0 8.6
A Lot 40.5 9.2 9.7 17.2 63.9
Namibia Not at All 17.1 88.2 10.1 0.6 1.1
Just a Little 35.9 13.1 78.0 7.8 1.1
Somewhat 34.2 6.5 21.3 66.6 5.6
A Lot 12.8 0.8 8.3 21.1 69.9
Nigeria Not at All 24.7 89.9 8.0 1.4 0.6
Just a Little 36.4 23.1 70.5 5.9 0.4
Somewhat 25.3 8.6 31.3 56.4 3.7
A Lot 13.6 12.6 14.4 33.0 40.0
Senegal Not at All 5.3 86.4 8.5 1.7 3.4
Just a Little 13.3 9.5 85.1 2.0 3.4
Somewhat 23.5 3.4 8.4 84.7 3.4
A Lot 58.0 3.6 4.6 14.1 77.7
South Africa Not at All 18.9 87.1 9.1 2.1 1.7
Just a Little 29.5 25.8 65.8 7.7 0.7
Somewhat 32.4 9.0 26.0 62.2 2.8
A Lot 19.2 14.0 15.4 29.5 41.1
Tanzania Not at All 2.5 68.6 18.9 6.2 6.3
Just a Little 15.9 8.0 80.1 9.0 3.0
Somewhat 48.3 4.6 18.1 75.3 2.0
A Lot 33.3 7.1 6.6 24.3 62.0
Uganda Not at All 7.0 83.7 10.2 2.8 3.4
Just a Little 30.5 17.2 73.6 7.9 1.4
Somewhat 35.9 7.4 38.7 51.1 2.8
A Lot 26.6 8.5 24.7 28.6 38.3
Zambia Not at All 7.9 91.1 6.7 1.1 1.1
Just a Little 45.8 14.7 79.4 4.4 1.5
Somewhat 29.6 6.2 31.0 61.4 1.5
A Lot 16.8 7.3 17.2 31.8 43.8
Notes: Countries’ means are computed by Trust in one’s own ethnic group. Means are weighted using the variable combinwt.
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Appendix I
Marginal Effects for Chapter 4
This section presents the marginal effects of the covariates of the preferred
specification (top panel in Table 4.6), which includes individual, ethnic group
and district characteristics as well as growth over the period 1980-2004. For
convenience, I organized the estimates in four tables, one for each level of
intra-ethnic trust; each column depicts presents the marginal effects on in-
ter-ethnic trust, evaluated at the average of covariates. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are also provided.
The reader should note that there are more than 2 categories of inter-ethnic
trust, the sign of the ordered probit coefficients predicts the direction of the
marginal effects in the extreme categories of inter-ethnic trust (Not at All and A
Lot) only. Indeed, the coefficients do not determine the direction of the marginal
effects in the middle categories (A Little and Somewhat).
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Appendix J
Description of the Data for
Chapter 4
This section describes the variables that are utilized in Chapter 4. They are
all obtained from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer surveys, except for the growth
variables that are obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.3.
J.0.1 Individual Characteristics
Personal Living Condition: Answers ordered from Very bad (1) to Very Good
(5) to the question In general, how would you describe: Your own present living
conditions? (Question q4b)
Primary Education: Constructed from the education question (Question q90).
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has any the following ed-
ucation level: No formal Schooling, Informal Schooling only (includes Koranic
Schooling), Some Primary Schooling or Primary School Completed.
Post Secondary Education: Constructed from the education question (Ques-
tion q90). Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has any of the
following education level: Post-secondary qualifications, other than university
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e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical / polytechnic / college, Some Univer-
sity, University Completed, or Post-Graduate.
Fulltime Worker: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent an-
swers any of Yes, full time (not looking) or Yes, full time (looking) to the question
Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are
you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? (Question
q94).
Stressed: Answer ordered from Never (0) to Always (3) to the question In the
last month, how much of the time: Have you been so worried or anxious that
you have felt tired, worn out, or exhausted? (Question q96b).
West Africa: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if an individual lives in one
of the following countries Benin, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.
J.0.2 Ethnic Characteristics
Worse Economic Condition: Median (constructed at the ethnic group level) of
the answers to the question Think about the condition of [Rs Ethnic Group].
Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups
in this country? (Question q80a). The answers are Much worse (5), Worse (4),
Same (3), Better(2) and Much Better (1).
Worse Political Condition: Median (constructed at the ethnic group level) of
the answers to the question Think about the condition of [Rs Ethnic Group].
Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in
this country? (Question q80b). The answers are Much less (5), Less (4), Same
(3), More (2) and Much more (1).
Unfair Treatment: Median (constructed at the ethnic group level) of the an-
swers to the questionHow often are [Rs Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the
government? (Question q81). The answers are Never (0), Sometimes (1), Often
(2) and Always (3).
Ethnic Share: Share of the ethnic group at the district or country level.
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Ethnic Fragmentation: The index of ethnic fragmentation follows Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002) and is given by the following formula:
Fragmentationd = 1 
X
g
S2g;l
where l represents a location (district or country), g an ethnic group present in
location l and Sg;l the share of ethnic group g in location l.
J.0.3 District Characteristics
School, Temple, Recreational Facilities, Community Building, Market
Stall: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the interviewer answered Yes
to the following question Were the following services present in the primary
sampling unit / enumeration area? (question 116).
J.0.4 Country Characteristics
Average Growth: Average annual growth rate in real output per capita. The
average is taken on the periods 1980   2004, 1990   2004 and 2000   2004. The
measure of output per capita is obtained from the real chain-weighted series
RGDPCH of the P.W.T. 6.3 as detailed in Heston, Summers and Aten (2009).
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